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INTRODUCTION

Debates over American foreign policy, particularly the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, have frequently been framed in terms
of whether they meet the conditions for a "just war."1 Authors
1 See, e.g., Michael Novak, Civilian Casualties& Turmoil, NATIONAL REVIEW
Feb. 18, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/novak/novak021803.asp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2005); The Moral Imperative: Religion, Morality and the War,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003, at 2003 WL 6245108; Louis Rene Beres, The Decision Ahead: Debatinga War Against Iraq, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 2003, at C1;
Margot Patterson, Catholic Press Takes Issue with U.S. War on Iraq, NATIONAL
ONLINE.,

CATHOLIC REPORTER,

Sept. 20, 2002, available at <http://www.natcath.org/NCR-

Online/archives/092002/092002j.htm>; John Kelsey,[sic] Just War: The Details,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 2002, at Cl; Brad Roberts, NBC-Armed Rogues: Is
There a Moral Case for Preemption, in CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
MISSILE DEFENSE, AND 'JUST WAR' TODAY 83 (Elliott Abrams ed., 1998); Ramesh

Ponnuru, Just Carter, NAT'L

REVIEW ONLINE,

Mar. 10, 2003; Peter Steinfels, Be-

liefs: The Just-War Tradition,Its Last-Resort Criterionand the Debate on an Invasion of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at A 16; A.C. Grayling, Fighting is a Last
Resort; Aquinas Defined the Just War: Few Conflicts Have Ever Met His Criteria,
NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 2002, at 10; Michael Quinlan, The Just War Litmus
Test, THE TABLET, Oct. 13, 2001, availableat http://thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/archivedb.cgi?tablet-00571; J. Bottum, You Say You Want a Just War? Look at What the
Coalition Forces Have Just Accomplished, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2003;
William Galston, Problems of Preemptive War; Why America's Place in the World
Will Shift - For the Worse - If We Attack Iraq, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 23,
2002, at 22; Jean Bethke Elshtain, A Just War, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 6, 2002; David
Blankenhorn, William A. Galston and John Kelsay, War Should Be Our Last Resort, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 2002, at G.1; Keith Pavlischek, Now, Only Preemption is Containment, Center for Public Justice - Capital Commentary, (Mar.
10, 2003), at http://www.cpjustice.orglstories/storyReader$948; Carol Eisenberg,
Principles and Practice/ Rethinking Just War Theory in a Time of Terrorism and
Weapons of Mass Destruction,NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 2003, at B.28.; Keith Pavlischek,
Just War Principles and Counterrorism,Center for Public Justice, Sept. 24, 2001
at http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$595; J. Bryan Hehir, What Can be
Done, AMERICA, Oct. 8, 2001, at http://www.americamagazine.org/gettext.cfm?articleTypelD=1&textlD=1066&issuelD=345; Richard Falk, Ends and Means: Defin-
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differ not only in their conclusions about the specific conflicts
but also in how they frame the issue. This is hardly surprising
because the just war tradition is a complex one, which has
evolved over the course of more than 1,500 years.
Originally, just war theory was proposed and developed by
Christian thinkers, especially theologians and canonists. Later
it acquired a philosophical foundation and subsequently found
partial expression in both customary and positive international
law. 2 This essay will draw freely on these various currents,
which constitute the larger just war tradition. When examining
provisions of international law, it will treat them not as legal
principles that require painstaking textual analysis, but as indications of the beliefs and positions of the international community, which to a large degree represent the development of
the just war tradition.
Although the just war tradition is wide-ranging and varied,
it is defined by certain basic premises that mark its outer limits. The belief that wars can sometimes be justified sets it apart
from pacifism, and the belief that the decision to go to war and
the methods of waging war are subject to moral scrutiny sets it
off from realism, which considers war outside the scope of moral
judgment. Within those limits, theorists working within the
just war tradition differ among themselves not only on nuances
of the theory but on basic points, such as whether a war can be
justified by anything other than the need to defend oneself
against an armed attack that has already begun.3 This article
offers readers a structured introduction to theories that fall
within the just war tradition, examining the substantial points
of agreement among those working within the tradition, the
points at which they differ and the grounds for those
differences.
Just war theory focuses on two questions: 1) the conditions
that can justify recourse to war, in classic terminology, the ius
ad bellum, and 2) the limitations on the methods that may
justly be used in waging war, the ius in bello. Although often
ing a Just War,

THE NATION,

Oct. 11, 2001, at 11; James Turner Johnson, Jihad

and Just War, FIRST THINGS, June/July 2002, at 12-14.
2 See James T. Johnson, Just War Theory: What's the Use? 19 WORLDVIEW 41
(1976).
3 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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given short shrift in expositions of just war theory, an issue,
which must be answered even before discussing the conditions
that can justify a particular war, is the moral justification for
deliberately killing enemy combatants. If direct killing of enemy combatants cannot be morally justified, there can be no
just war. I will, therefore, address that question in Part II of
this article. Part III will deal with the ius ad bellum, and Part
IV will examine the ius in bello.
II.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR KILLING ENEMY COMBATANTS

Many just war theorists simply assume that the deliberate
killing of enemy combatants can be morally justified provided
that the ius ad bellum and ius in bello conditions are met.
There are two reasons, however, why we need to explore the
moral justification for the deliberate killing of enemy combatants: first, if it cannot be justified, there can be no just war, and
second, an understanding of why deliberate killing of enemy
combatants is permissible is essential to understanding one of
the principal aspects of the ius in bello, the immunity of noncombatants from direct attack.
Virtually every ethical system reflects the basic principle
that deliberately taking the life of an innocent human being is
wrong. Classical just war theory requires "the habitual and
mutual recognition" of "the fundamental unity and moral equality of the belligerents." 4 In a just war, "the state of war in
which [the belligerents] find themselves is not allowed to obscure the common humanity of the belligerents." 5 Just war theory requires, therefore, even more than other positions, a
justification for killing enemy combatants.
Many just war theorists simply translate the moral principle that intentionally killing innocent human beings is wrong,
into the principle that intentionally killing noncombatants is
wrong, with the implication that killing combatants is not
wrong. It is not, however, immediately obvious that noncombatants are innocent and combatants are not, 6 and therefore it is
4 A.J. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR 60 (1997).
5 Id.
6 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The Killing of the Innocent, in WAR, MORALITY, AND
THE MILITARY PROFESSION 341, 350 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 2d. ed. 1986). ("Why,

then should we worry about killing noncombatants and think it wrong to do so -
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not immediately obvious that one may kill combatants with
7
moral impunity.
If we take the term "innocent" to mean "free from moral
wrong, sin or guilt," some noncombatants, for example a newspaper editor who deliberately stirs up an unjust war, may be
guilty with respect to the war. Many enemy soldiers, on the
other hand, may be entirely guilt-free with respect to the war.
They may have been conscripted against their will, and may
scrupulously avoid violating the legal and moral rules of war.
Whatever the moral character of their individual private lives,
there may be nothing about their status as combatants that
stains them with any moral guilt. They may be equally innocent from the legal point of view, having broken no laws that
would expose them to punishment, much less to capital
punishment.
If the principle that it is always wrong to directly kill the
innocent absolutely forbade killing those who are not morally or
legally guilty, there could be no just war.8 It is essential, therefore, to ask in what sense enemy combatants should be considered guilty, or at least non-innocent, and therefore subject to
being deliberately killed in war.
One of the earliest and most influential formulators of a
just war theory, Augustine, analogizes a just war to an individual's defense of another person who is being attacked. Just as
an individual who witnesses an unjust attack on another may
use force to defend the person being attacked, so too public authorities may defend the common good and society with violence, even lethal violence. This analogy throws light on the
especially when we realize that among the noncombatants there will be some, at
any rate, who are morally and/or legally guilty of various things and that among
the combatants there will be those who are morally and/or legally innocent?")
7 As Murphy has observed, "when we unthinkingly reduce the moral prohibition against intentional killing of innocents to . . . 'Do not kill noncombatants' we
lose the background of moral and legal thinking which makes the principle seem
plausible when formulated in terms of innocence." Id.
8 Holmes, for instance, is led by the contention that the relevant consideration is moral innocence to the conclusion that no modern war can be just. See
ROBERT L. HOLMES, ON WAR AND MORALITY 183-200 (1989). But see Germain G.
Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing 15 AM. J. JURIs. 64
(1970) (arguing that the moral innocence of individual enemy soldiers makes it
immoral to intend to kill them, but arguing for an expanded version of the principle of double effect which, he maintains, justifies defensive wars.)

5
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meaning of innocence because, in the case of defense of an individual, we do not require the defender to inquire into the personal moral guilt of the attacker before repelling his attack.
Provided that the attack does not seem to be objectively justified, the mere fact of attacking another renders the attacker liable to being repulsed by force, even if the aggressor is suffering
from a psychological condition that deprives him of freedom and
consequently of moral and legal responsibility. 9 What is significant in self-defense is not the personal moral guilt or innocence
of the attacker but his use of force against another without objective moral justification. This is also true of an enemy
combatant.
Thomas Aquinas does not directly address the justification
for killing individual enemy combatants, but the answer he
would have given had he posed the question can be clearly discerned from what he says about closely related topics. In the
internal affairs of a community, Aquinas says, public authorities may lawfully kill someone who has become "dangerous and
infectious to the community."1 0 In fact, according to Aquinas,
"it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order
to safeguard the common good."' Aquinas' stress here is on the
12
defense of the common good.
Similarly, in order to safeguard the common good of the
community against external enemies, public authorities may
use lethal force. 1 3 It is important to note that Aquinas is not
talking here only about indirect or unintended killing of enemy
combatants. In a justified war, according to Aquinas, direct,
9 See RICHARD

J.

REGAN, JUST WAR: PRINCIPLES AND CASES

87 (1996).

10 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II, II, q. 64, art. 2. This statement

occurs in the course of an inquiry into whether it is ever lawful to kill sinners, and
the specific reference is to a "man who is dangerous and infectious to the community on account of some sin." Id. The justification Aquinas offers, however, focuses

not on the personal moral guilt of the individual, but on the defense of the common
good against an attack that is not objectively justified.
11
12

Id.

See id. at II, I, q. 64, art. 6. ("[T]he slaying of the sinner becomes lawful in
relation to the common good.") Although the focus is on the defense of the community rather than on personal guilt or innocence, not every danger to the community
justifies the use of lethal force against the person posing the threat. Although
persons who have SARS represent a threat to the community, it is not a threat
that is objectively unjust, and the authorities would not be justified in killing them
as if they were civet cats.
13 See id. at q. 40, art. 1.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/1
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14 as
i.e., intentional, killing of enemy combatants is permissible
15
injustice.
a means of defending the community against
Individual enemy soldiers may be killed because being a
combatant in an army which is waging an unjust war makes a
man dangerous and harmful to the community against which
he is fighting, and therefore "non-innocent" in the relevant
sense, independent of personal moral guilt or innocence.1 6 As
Regan puts it, "It is the wrong that enemy personnel are committing, not their individual moral responsibility for it, that jus7
tifies the victim nation's use of killing force against them."'
Modern just war theorists follow Augustine and Aquinas in
focusing on the defense of the common good and the analogy to
self-defense to justify the deliberate killing of enemy combatants. Potter, for instance, argues:

We live by the presumption that men must do no harm to their
neighbors. That presumption can be overridden when it is necessary to restrain wrongdoers from inflicting harm. Only the necessity can grant to anyone an excuse to kill . . . . Only those
immediately and actively engaged in the bearing of hostile force
in an unjust cause are properly subject to direct attack. 18
14 See id. at II, II, q. 64, art. 7. ("[It is not lawful for a man to intend killing a
man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending
to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier
fighting against the foe." See also Richard Shelly Hartigan, THE FORGOTTEN VICTIM: A HISTORY OF THE CIVLIAN 47 (1982). ("Aquinas in this respect does not add

anything to Augustine's position, but he does state unequivocally what Augustine
had implied but hesitated to state as clearly: The enemy may be killed directly as
a means to the end of preserving or defending the common good."); See also ALAN
DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 163 (1977); BERNARD T. ADENEY, JUST WAR,
POLITICAL REALISM, AND FAITH 39 (1988).
15 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II, II, q. 40, art. 1. (Public authorities may have
recourse to war in "defending the common weal against external enemies.")
16 "In line with its etymological derivation from the Latin nocere ('to harm'),
'innocent' in this context means 'harmless' rather than 'blameless." COATES, supra
note 4, at 235. Walzer concurs: 'innocent' is a "term of art which means that [the
innocent persons] have done nothing, and are doing nothing, that entails the loss
of their rights." MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 146 (1977). The combatant does not enjoy the immunity to violence which noncombatants enjoy "because he already is a fighter.
He has been made into a dangerous man, and though his options may have been
few, it is nevertheless accurate to say that he has allowed himself to be made into a
dangerous man. For that reason, he finds himself endangered." Id. at 145.
17 See REGAN, supra note 9, at 87.
18 Ralph B. Jr. Potter, The Moral Logic of War, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 198, 208 (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992).
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Murphy puts it as follows:
If one believes (as I do) that the only even remotely plausible justification for war is self-defense, then one must in waging war
confine one's hostility to those against whom one is defending oneself, i.e. those in the (both causal and logical) chain of command or
responsibility or agency all those who can reasonably be regarded
as engaged in an attempt to destroy you.19

This moral justification of killing enemy combatants depends on the fulfillment of the ad bellum conditions. It is only
in a war in which one is justified and the enemy objectively unjustified that one may rightly kill enemy combatants. Only the
defense of the community against unjust danger provides the
moral justification for the direct killing of enemy combatants. 20
See also G.E.M.

ANSCOMBE, THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF

G.E.M. AN.

3: ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 53 (1981). ("What is required, for
the people attacked to be non-innocent in the relevant sense, is that they should
themselves be engaged in an objectively unjust proceeding which the attacker has
SCOMBE: VOL.

the right to make his concern; or - the commonest case - should be unjustly attack-

ing him. Then he can attack them with a view to stopping them."); Similarly:
[T]he core of the concept of innocence in common morality's precept forbidding the killing of the innocent is non-liability to capital punishment, not
moral guiltlessness. The behaviour of enemy combatants threatens just
social order, and was readily assimilated to the behaviour of those guilty
of capital crimes. While they may be neither morally nor legally guilty,

they are like the legally (capitally) guilty in the threat they pose. Thus,
killing them is considered justified, and so they are not called "innocent."
JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 88 (1987).
19 See Murphy, supra note 6, at 350. Alan Donagan holds that:
[Riespect for man as rational forbids using force at will upon others. Yet
the immunity to violence to which everybody consequently has a moral
right is obviously conditional; and perhaps its most obvious condition is
that one not further one's own ends by resorting to violence or threatening
it. If anybody, in furthering his own ends, resorts to violence or threatens
it, he ceases to satisfy the condition of his right to immunity and may be
forcibly withstood. By violating the immunity of others, he forfeits his
own. In general: It is permissible for any human being to use force upon
another in such measure as may be necessary to defend rationalcreatures
from the other's violence.) (emphasis in original).
See Donegan, supra note 14, at 84-85.
20 COLM McKEOGH, THE POLITICAL REALISM OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A PRAG-

WAR 165, n.25 (1997). Specifically:
[I] n war, even in a justified war of self-defense, the killing (even when it is
necessary and the last resort) is the means to the achievement of the good
effect. Killing is not unintended nor is it causally independent of successful defense. Catholic just war theorists get out of this problem by claiming that the intentionality on the part of the attacker, being itself evil,
removes the right to life that he otherwise has. This is the crucial role

MATIC APPROACH TO JUST

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/1
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According, then, to those just war theorists who stop to answer the question, deliberate killing of enemy combatants in a
just war is morally acceptable because their participation in an
unjust attack on others means that they are not innocent
human beings whose killing would be immoral. They may not
be personally guilty from a moral or legal point of view, but
their role in an unjust attack deprives them of the kind of innocence that would make targeting them immoral.
III.

IUs AD

BELLUM.

WHEN IS RECOURSE TO WAR JUSTIFIED?

Just war theory establishes four conditions which must be
met in order for a war to be considered justified: A) There must
be a just cause; B) The war must be declared by a lawful authority; C) There must be an appropriate proportion between the
goals sought and the costs, both physical and moral; and D) War
must be the last resort. The following four subsections will explore each of these conditions.
A.

Just Cause

In medieval and early modern just war theory, the question
of what goals could justify a war-generally referred to as just
cause-was paramount. From the 18th century until fairly recently, it lost prominence. Since World War II, the question of
just cause has reclaimed the attention of scholars, received considerable attention in positive international law, and has become the subject of sometimes passionate public debate. This
section will first lay out the general theory of just cause, (subsection 1) and then examine two issues which have received
special attention in recent years: humanitarian intervention
(subsection 2) and preemption (subsection 3).
1.

What Causes Are Sufficient to Justify War?

Medieval just war theory generally recognized three goals
that could justify recourse to war: defense against attack, replayed by the ad bellum requirement of a 'wrongful aggressor'. A person's

right to life is inviolable but, once he chooses to do evil, he is held to lose
this right and can thus be treated as a means to an end. If one party, in

lawfully pursuing his aims, infringes on those of another, the latter party
cannot treat the former as an aggressor. There must be the moral evil of a

choice to do human evil.
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covery of something wrongfully taken, and punishment of evil. 2 1
The goal of punishing evil loomed large in medieval theory, to
the point that, for Thomas Aquinas, it was the principal justification of war.2 2 Modern theorists have abandoned punishment
for moral guilt as a justification of war, stressing instead the
righting of objective wrongs, 2 3 including the defense of human
rights.
In the nineteenth century, the great European powers (and
the United States in the' Caribbean) frequently resorted to war
to protect the economic interests of their citizens or to resolve
territorial disputes, especially in their dealings with what we
now call developing countries. Although injury to the economic
interests of nationals and territorial disputes 24 may give one
nation a just claim against another, the contemporary consensus is that the enormously destructive character of modern warfare, even when carried out only with conventional weapons,
makes war an inappropriate instrument for resolving such
questions. 25 In one sense, this is a question of "proportionality"
rather than just cause, but because the conclusion is that the
means are always disproportional to the end, it seems clearer,
as well as briefer, to say that neither economic injury to the interests of nationals nor claims to lost territory constitute just
21 See James Turner Johnson, Just Cause Revisited, in CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND 'JUST WAR' TODAY 3, 8 (Elliott Abrams

ed., 1998).
22 See ALFRED VANDERPOL, LA DOCTRINE SCHOLASTIQUE DE LA DROIT DE
GUERRE 250 (1919) (cited in JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 6); See also HARTIGAN,
supra note 14, at 41-43.
23 The righting of objective wrongs was not entirely absent from medieval theory. It received more attention in the work of the canonists than in that of the
theologians. The canonists stressed the recovery of wrongfully taken goods. In so
doing, they talked more about the objective wrong involved than about the subjective guilt of the party who had taken the goods. See HARTIGAN, supra note 14, at
43. The theologians tended to stress subjective guilt. Aquinas, for instance, views
even a war to regain goods wrongfully taken as primarily involving punishment of
the wrong committed, namely the refusal to return what has been wrongfully
taken, rather than as a means of forcing restoration of an objective order of things.
See id. at 41-42.
24 In speaking of territorial disputes, I refer to recovery of territory that has
been held by the opposing power for a considerable period of time, rather than an
effort to resist an invasion or to undo a recent occupation. Resisting invasion and
attempting to eject forces that have recently occupied a territory may fall into the
category of defensive war, which modern theorists see as a just cause for war.
25 See REGAN, supra note 9, at 56-63.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/1
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cause for war. This is not to say that the claims themselves are
not grounded in justice, but only that they are not sufficient to
justify resort to war.
Many contemporary just war theorists limit just cause exclusively to defense. 26 This approach began in the nineteenth
century, in response to the growing destructiveness of war
caused by technical developments such as the repeating rifle
and machine gun, and by the vastly increased size of armies
made possible by the levee en mass, which in turn reflected the
spread of nationalism and revolutionary fervor. The horrific experience of World War I lent new strength to the movement to
eliminate war altogether, or at least to limit the justifiable
causes of war to defense against armed aggression. Immediately after World War I, the Covenant of the League of Nations
expressed the signatories' desire "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the
2 7 Members of
acceptance of obligations not to resort to war."
the League took on obligations to submit various types of disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement, or enquiry by the
League Council, 28 and renounced the right to go to war against
29
any state that accepted the outcome of those processes.
Within the just war theory, few authors make any systematic effort to explore the reasoning which justifies defensive war. Self-defense is usually taken as
the starting point of analysis, with the question being not whether it is justified,
but whether other causes can also justify war.
A few authors have explored the justification of defensive war. Walzer outlines what he calls "the theory of aggression" as a justification of defensive war.
His argument can be summarized as follows: There is an international society of
states. Its law establishes the rights of its members, above all territorial integrity
and political sovereignty. Any use of force by one state against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of another constitutes aggression. Aggression is a criminal
act that justifies both individual and collective defense. See MICHAEL WALZER,
61JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
to
that
argues
He
war.
defensive
of
justification
63 (1977). Orend offers a Kantian
deny a state the right to protect its people from aggression would be unreasonable
and unfair, and would ignore the responsibility of the aggressor. The right of selfdefense, he continues, is essential in a world in which there are no reliable or effective international mechanisms for guaranteeing the rights of states and in which
as a last resort armed force is the most effective and reliable form of self-defense.
See BRIAN OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 177180 (2000).
26

27 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, Preamble.
28
29

See id. art. 12 & 13.
See id. art. 12, 13 & 15.
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In 1928, the signatories of the Kellogg Briand Pact "condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce[d] it, as an instrument of national
policy in the relations [of the parties] with one another."30 They
"agree[d] that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by
pacific means." 3 1 Neither the League Covenant nor the Kellogg
Briand Pact included any effective enforcement mechanism, but
each reflected a growing international consensus against war as
a legitimate instrument of national policy. 32
The enormous carnage of World War II further increased
revulsion toward war. As a result, the drafters of the United
Nations Charter limited the circumstances in which recourse to
war would be legal to defense against active aggression.
Article 2(4) of the Charter establishes as a general principle
that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 33 The
Charter charges the Security Council with making recommendations and deciding how to meet "any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression."3 4 In addition to economic and diplomatic boycotts, 3 5 the Security Council is authorized to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations."3 6
The UN Charter's only explicit exception to Article 2 (4)'s
prohibition against the use of armed force by individual states
not acting as agents of the Security Council is Article 51 which
30 Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, art. I. More than 50
countries joined the pact by 1929.
31 Id. art. II.
32 A thorough study of the pact is found in ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN
THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT
33 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.

(1952).

34 Id. art. 39.
35 Id. art. 41.
36 Id. art. 42.
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recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations."3 7 Even this right of individual and collective self-defense survives only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."

38

Until fairly recently, the majority view was that under the
UN Charter, the only remaining legal justifications of war were
39 According to this view,
individual and collective self-defense.
under the Charter, all recourse to force in international relations necessarily fell into one of three categories: crimes, selfdefense (whether individual or collective), and sanctions under40
taken or authorized by the Security Council. The significance
of this position depends to a large degree on how broadly or narrowly the concept of self-defense is read. The wording of the
Charter's provision on self-defense ("if an armed attack occurs")
4 1 although highly
seems to suggest a very narrow reading,
respected international42 lawyers have made arguments for relatively broad readings.
In the writings of philosophers, theologians, and other just
war theorists, stress on "defense" as the only or primary justification of war has led to a subtle but very important shift in just
37 Id. art. 51. Collective self-defense can be understood in two quite different
ways. Under one view, one state may aid another only when the attack on the first
state presents a threat to the security of the state offering assistance. Under the
other view, any group of states is free to treat an attack on any member of the
group as an attack on all the members. The latter vision is built into, for instance,
the Rio Treaty which obliges all members of the Organization of American States
to come to the aid of any member state who is attacked. This approach is especially likely to condone intervention in a conflict and to discourage recourse to the
procedures of the United Nations. See TOM J. FARER, THE LAW OF WAR 25 YEARS
AFTER NUREMBERG 67 (1971).
38 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
39 See, e.g., WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 23
(1981); FARER, supra note 37, at 27. Recent experiences of humanitarian interventions not carried out directly by the UN, but enjoying greater or lesser UN approval have suggested the possibility of such actions being compatible with the
Charter.
40 FARER, supra note 37, at 27.
41 See Brad Roberts, NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for Preemp-

tion, in

CLOSE CALLS: INTERVENTION,

TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND 'JUST

WAR' TODAY 83, 91 (Elliott Abrams ed., 1998).
42 See FARER, supra note 37 at 30-36 (discussing various broad readings of the
self-defense provision of the Charter).
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war theory. The starting point in classic just war theory was an
injustice that needed to be remedied, and war was viewed as a
potential way of remedying that injustice. Classic just war theory paid little attention to who fired the first shot. During the
twentieth century, war - far from being viewed as a potential
tool for remedying injustice - came to be seen as the problem
that needed to be solved. 43 The goal became not so much establishing or reestablishing justice as lowering the incidence of
war, and if possible, eliminating it altogether. Many hoped that
this could be accomplished by condemning all "aggressive" recourse to war as unjust and limiting the situations in which recourse to war could be justified to "defensive" responses.
Contemporary discussions thus tend to focus not on an injustice
to be remedied but on "aggression," identified as the first use of
force. In this mode of analysis, the rights and wrongs of the
underlying conflict that caused the war have little importance:
the significant factor is the first use of force. 44
Several factors underlie this shift in focus. First, the destructiveness of modern warfare. Experience of the vast loss of
life and destruction caused by World War I and World War II,
and fear of the even greater carnage and destruction that strategic nuclear warfare would entail, make modern warfare seem
43 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 17.
4 Addressing the UN General Assembly on the Suez Crisis, Secretary of
State Dulles, for example, said:
[Ilf we were to agree that the existence of injustice in the world, which
this organization so far has been unable to cure, means that the principle
of renunciation of force is no longer respected and that there still exists
the right wherever a nation feels itself subject to injustice, to resort to
force to try to correct that injustice, then ... we would have, I fear, torn
this Charter into shreds and the world would again be a world of anarchy.
See ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
DOCTRINE 13 (1960) (quoting John Foster Dulles, Address to the United Nations,
(Nov. 1, 1956) (Department of State Bulletin, xxxv, 752)). Mr. Justice Jackson,
setting forth the American position on the responsibility of Nazi leaders in 1945
stated: "we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a trial of the causes of war,
for our position is that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive
war." See id. at 12 (quoting Statement by Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals (Aug. 8, 1945) (Department of State Bulletin, XII, 228)). In his opening statement before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Jackson was even more explicit:
"whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it finds
that status
quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those conditions." See id. at 12 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, TRIAL OF MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
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disproportionate to any good that might be achieved. 45 Second,
admitting that a state might be justified in initiating a war
46 Third, for
would hinder efforts to outlaw war altogether.
those who aspire to see the United Nations develop into a
supra-national community with real authority to resolve disputes among nations, it is important to try to concentrate power
in the hands of supra-national decision makers and to limit the
scope and authority of individual states. 47 Fourth, limiting justified war to defense against armed attack serves the interests
of states and their leaders who want to preserve the status
quo. 48 Finally, the dominance of the state system, with its cor-

ollaries of state sovereignty and non-intervention, has undermined the traditional just war conception that in waging war a
nation might be vindicating not only its own parochial interests
but the well-being of the universal community of mankind. If
what is at stake in war is limited to the well-being of a particuits judgment that it
lar community, the reasons for mistrusting
49
increase.
is justified in going to war
The shift from "just cause" to "defense" has been embraced
by recent Popes and other official exponents of Catholic just war
teaching. 50 Unilateral stress on defense has, however, been re45 See, e.g.,
note 4 at 156.
46
47

ROBERT L. PHILLIPS, WAR AND JUSTICE

26 (1984);

COATES,

supra

See PHILLIPS, supra note 45 at 26.
See John Courtney Murray, S.J., Remarks on the Moral Problem of War, in

247, 252-53
(Richard B. Miller ed., 1992). Thus as early as 1931, in light of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and the Kellogg Briand Pact, a distinguished group of theologians reasoned that, "a war declared by a State on its own authority without previous recourse to the international institutions which exist cannot be a lawful social
process." Conclusions of the Conventus of Fribourg, in JAMES TURNER JOHNSON,
JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INWAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS

QUIRY 340 (1981).

See

JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 17
See COATES, supra note 4, at 156-57.
50 Pius XII (1939-1958) rejected war as a "legitimate solution for international
controversies and a means for the realization of national aspirations." John
Courtney Murray, S.J., supra note 47, at 252. "All wars of aggression, whether just
or unjust, fall under the ban of moral prescription." Id. at 252. However Pius XII
reluctantly admitted the possibility of just wars of self-defense against very grave
injustices. Id. at 252-54.
John XXIII (1958-63) asserted that "it no longer makes sense to maintain that
war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice." John XXIII,
Pacem in Terris, Encyclical Letter on Establishing Universal Peace in TRUTH, JUSTICE, CHARITY, AND LIBERTY, n. 127, April 11, 1963, available at http://www.
48
49
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vatican.va/holyfather/john xxiiiencyclicals/documents/hf jiii
enc 11041963
pacem-en.html. Taken out of context, the statement could be read as embracing
pacifism, but in context it seems to refer primarily or perhaps exclusively to strategic nuclear war and to leave room for going to war to "repel an injustice that is
being perpetrated, but is not yet accomplished." PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 208
(1968) (discussing John XXIII's statement.) Thus John XXIII continued in the line
of Pius XII in rejecting altogether offensive use of force but sanctioning in some
cases defensive war short of all-out nuclear war. Paul VI (1963-78) ardently
longed for a world order free of war. Cf. Paul VI, Speech to the United Nations,
Oct. 4, 1965. ("never again war, never again!"). Nonetheless, he accepted - however reluctantly - that nations continue to need defensive weapons. Cf Paul VI,
Speech to the United Nations, Oct. 4, 1965. ("As long as man remains weak,
changeable and wicked ...

defensive arms will, alas! be necessary.")

John Paul 11 (1978-2005) continued the line of thought begun by his recent
predecessors and took it further. While continuing to reject pacifism and to admit
a right to armed self-defense, he passionately urged rejection of war and commitment to peace. On innumerable occasions he extolled peace and called on his hearers to work for it. See, e.g., his annual messages on World Peace Day (January 1).
He described war as "a defeat for humanity," John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, (January 1, 2000), at http://www.vatican.va/
holy father/j ohnpaul ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii mes_08121999_xxx.
iii-world-day-for-peace-en.html. (Italics in original). He has also warned that war
breeds more war and rarely solves problems:
The twentieth century bequeaths to us above all else a warning: wars are
often the cause of further wars because they fuel deep hatreds, create situations of injustice and trample upon people's dignity and rights. Wars
generally do not resolve the problems for which they are fought and therefore, in addition to causing horrendous damage, they ultimately prove
futile.
Id. (Italics in original.)
John Paul II was not a pacifist who saw no role for force in human life. He did,
however, distinguish sharply war between states from international uses of force
in the service of justice. Given the state of international relations, he recognized
that at times individual states may be justified in going to war "in the case of
legitimate defense against an aggressor." (Pope John Paul II, Message to Military
Chaplains, (Mar. 24, 2003), at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/
speeches/2003/marclhdocuments/hfjp-ii spe_20030325_cappellani-militari_en.
html. He sees, however, no other justification for war between states. Id.
Central to John Paul II's thought was the hope that humanity can move beyond
the stage of disorganization which is the only justification of wars among individual states. "Just as the time has finally come," he said, "when in individual States
a system of private vendetta and reprisal has given way to the rule of law, so too a
similar step forward is now urgently needed in the international community."
Pope John Paul II, Centesimus annus, section 52 (May 1, 1991), at http://www.
vatican.valholy-father/johnpaulii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-ii-enc 01051991
centesimus-annusen.html. Even such progress would not, however, mean that
force would never be needed. International authorities may need to use force when
other means are inadequate. It is highly significant that when negotiation and
mediation have failed to put an end to genocide and other grave crimes against
humanity, John Paul II even called on the international community to take "concrete measures to disarm the aggressor." Pope John Paul II, Message for the
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jected by some prominent just war theorists. They reject the
distinction between first and second use of force as "morally
sterile."5 1 Aggression, they argue, "does not consist in the use of
force as such (regardless of whether the use be offensive or defensive), but in the unjust use of force." 5 2 "Why must it be
World Day of Peace, "Dialogue Between Cultures For A Civilization Of Love And
Peace" (Jan. 1, 2000), at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul ii/messages/
peace/documents/hfjp-ii mes 20001208_xxxiv-world-day-for-peace-en.html.
Although recognizing the role of force in human life, the overall thrust of John
Paul II's thought is clearly marked by a profound skepticism about the justifications for war and a passionate commitment to promoting peaceful solutions to international conflicts.
The extent to which official Catholic teaching on just war - and concretely on
just cause - has evolved in recent decades can be seen in the Second Edition of the
official Catechism of the Catholic Church, approved and promulgated by John Paul
II in 1997. It recognizes that "as long as the danger of war persists and there is no
international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments
cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed"
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1994) 2308, (emphasis added). It offers,
however, no hint that war might ever be justified except in case of self-defense.
Although it offers a summary of what it describes as "the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the "just war' doctrine" that list makes no mention ofjust
cause. Id. at 2309. Clearly there has been a sea change in official Catholic thinking on just war. See J. Bryan Hehir, Just War Theory in a Post-Cold War World,
20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237, 248-52 (1992) (discussing the changed approach of
Catholic teaching on war).
The subject of this article is just war theory, and I have deliberately focused in
this section on the narrow issue of whether anything other than defense against
aggression constitutes a just cause for war. The Popes, however, especially John
Paul II have not addressed just war theory on its own terms, but have rather focused their attention on a much broader context of peace, the development of international institutions, justice in the relations between nations, development as a
solution to many of the conflicts that lead to war, respect for life, forgiveness, skepticism about the ability of war to solve problems, and appreciation for non-violent
approaches to problem solving. None of these factors taken singularly, nor all of
them taken together, eliminate the need to answer at times the questions which
just war theory is designed to help answer, but they do require us to think about a
much wider range of issues and may at times lead to a different answer than we
would reach if our only concern were the question of whether or not we could justify going to war. Cf Drew Christiansen, S.J., Hawks, Doves, and Pope John Paul
II, AMERICA, Aug. 12, 2002, availableat http://www.americamagazine.org/gettext.
cfm?textlD=2438&articletypeid=l&issueID=398&search=1 (explaining how John
Paul II "has set the stage for a reformulation of Catholic thinking about war, peace
and non-violence"); William L. Portier, Are We Really Serious When We Ask God to
Deliver Us From War? The Catechism and the Challenge of Pope John Paul II,
23:1 CoMMUNIo: INT'L CATHOLIC REV. 47-63 (1996), available at http://www.ewtn.
com/library/ISSUES/FROMWAR.TXT (commenting on the extent to which John
Paul II has modified Catholic teaching on war).
51 COATES, supra note 4, at 159.
52 Id.
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wrong," they ask, "to strike the first blow in a struggle? The
only question is who is in the right, if anyone is." 53 While conceding that a just war must be "normatively defensive," in the
sense that it is a response to an unjust threat to a state and its
people, they contend that its tactics may be "empirically offensive" when it is a response to a credible, grave, and imminent
54
threat for which there is compelling evidence.
In summary, there is general agreement that defense
against armed aggression constitutes just cause for war. Just
war theory is, however, currently in a state of flux regarding
other possible justifications for war between individual states.
Both international law and many just war theorists have moved
toward rejecting all other justifications for war between individual states. Some theorists, however, continue to argue that a
wider range of circumstances justifies having resort to war, and
the status of international law on the issue is not entirely clear.
In recent decades, attention has focused especially on the issues
raised by humanitarian interventions and preemptive attacks.
The next two subsections deal with these topics.
2.

HumanitarianIntervention

Many contemporary just war theorists include among the
causes that may justify armed intervention in the affairs of a
state the reestablishment of "an order necessary for decent
human existence." 55 This implies some willingness to accept
the use of armed force in what has become known in recent decades as "humanitarian intervention," i.e., interference in the
internal affairs of a state by another state or group of states (or
by the international community represented by the United Nations) to protect human rights in situations involving gross violations of those rights or radical state break-down.
53 G.E.M. Anscombe, Mr. Truman's Decree, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 237, 252 (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992). See
also, JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION, supra note 47, at 359 ("When the emphasis is

put on priority of resort to force, the question of justice, which has moral priority,
is obscured."); JOSEPH L. ALLEN, WAR: A PRIMER FOR CHRISTIANS 36-37 (1991) ("It
is not necessarily wrong to initiate a war. Protecting people from an unjust attack
may sometimes be justified.").
54 See OREND, supra note 26, at 182.
55 See Potter, supra note 18, at 200. See also ALLEN, supra note 53, at 36.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/1

18

2004] AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUST WAR TRADITION 239
Acceptance by authors within the just war tradition of the
protection of human rights as justification for armed intervention in the affairs of a state reflects a much wider contemporary
consensus among the educated public, political theorists, and
56
international lawyers on the importance of human rights.
Since the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (1948),5 7 the belief that human rights are not entirely
matters of domestic concern of individual states has posed a
challenge to the Westphalian system of sovereign states and
58
non-intervention.
Nonetheless, all contemporary just war theorists recognize
that caution and restraint are called for in the area of humanitarian interventions. Restraint is called for, in the first place,
because humanitarian interventions represent overt violations
of the sovereignty of states and respect for sovereignty still lies
at the base of the international system and still protects from
chaos an international order which has no effective centralized
authority. 59
Some authors working within the just war tradition justify
violations of sovereignty in extreme cases of human rights violations by invoking the pre-Westphalian "assumption of a univer60
sal community of mankind, transcending particular polities."
In this conception, "the good of that community [has] moral primacy, and [is] the ultimate measure of the justice or injustice of
war."6 1 Professor James Johnson, for instance, argues for "a
conception of international order in which the responsibilities of
states do not stop at their own borders or with their own interests as defined by political realism, but may extend to interven56 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, International Law and Social Movements: Towards Transformation, 97 A.S.I.L. PROC. 296, 297 (2003).
57 See Universal Declarations of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/
lang/eng.pdf.
58 See Hehir, supra note 50, at 244
59 Id.
60 COATES, supra note 4, at 156-157. At the end of the 16th century, Alberico
Genitili wrote in DE IURE BELLI, a seminal work on the law of war: "the subjects of
others do not seem to me to be outside that kinship of nature and society formed by
the whole world." David M. Barnes, Intervention and the Just War Traditionat n.
22 available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPEOO/BarnesOO.html quoting

ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURI BELLI.
61 COATES,

supra note 4, at 157.

19

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 16:221

tion into the territories of other states in situations where there
62
are major violations of justice and grave humanitarian need."
Other authors solve the tension between humanitarian intervention and respect for sovereignty by arguing that a state
which grossly violates the human rights of its citizens, forfeits
its right to be treated as sovereign. 6 3 Finally, some authors argue that, despite the systemic value of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, the need to protect human rights
against gross violations calls for a cautious modification of those
principles. They would allow intervention in a set of circumstances that includes more than genocide, but is still carefully
64
circumscribed.
Another reason for caution in humanitarian interventions
is that, beyond formal recognition of sovereignty, state boundaries should normally be respected because they represent the

62 James Turner Johnson, Thinking Morally About Intervention, PACEM 21999, available at http://www.pacem.no/1999/2/intervensjon/johnson/. In his Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, January 1, 2000, John Paul II
expressed the same idea:
[Ain offense against human rights is an offense againstthe conscience of
humanity as such, an offense against humanity itself. The duty of protecting these rights therefore extends beyond the geographic and political
borders within which they are violated. Crimes against humanity cannot
be considered an internal affair of a nation. (Italics in original).
John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, (January 1,
2000), at http://www.vatican.vaholyfather/john..paul-ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii mes_08121999_xxxiii-world-day-for-peaceen.html.
See also, Nico Krish, Legality, Morality, and the Dilemma of HumanitarianIntervention, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323, 326 (2002). (noting the movement of international
discourse toward "solidarist" positions); NIKoLAos K. TSAGOURIAS, JURISPRUDENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION (2000) (advocating a legal
interpretation of humanitarian intervention based on human dignity); NIcHOILAS J.
WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000) (arguing that a view of international relations based on solidarity
justifies humanitarian interventions of single states and criticizing the rejection of
such intervention on pluralist grounds as reflecting moral bankruptcy).
63 See PHILLIPS supra note 45, AT 21. ("[I]f it consistently fails to protect the
'life, liberty, and property' of its inhabitants, one might very well argue that the
sovereignty is dissolved anyway and there therefore there is no intervention in the
affairs of a sovereign state."); See Wheeler, supra note 16, at 90-91 (arguing that
states must satisfy minimal requirements of respect for human rights to be entitled to the protection which the principle of non-intervention affords to sovereign
states).
64 See, e.g., Hehir, supra note 58, at 8.
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boundaries of communities.6 5 The gross violations of human
rights that justify humanitarian intervention, however, indicate that there is no functioning community.
Finally, just war theorists recognize that there are powerful systemic reasons for caution in justifying armed intervention in the internal affairs or civil war of a country:
First, there may be fundamental international disagreement
about the standard of justice to be applied. Second, there may be
fundamental international disagreement about the application of
a universally accepted standard of justice to particular cases.
Third, intervention may prove very costly in human lives if the
dominant local or regional population perceives it to be politically,
economically, or ethnically motivated. Fourth, assuming that individual nations and the world community would be unable or unwilling to prevent or remedy every violation of human rights, on
what basis could they or should they choose to intervene in particular cases? Fifth, interventions avowedly to prevent or remedy
human rights violations could easily mask, or be transformed
into, intervention to annex territory or dismember the affected
nation. Sixth, nations might seek to manipulate U.N.-sanctioned
intervention for their own political, economic, or ethnic advantage
rather than to alleviate human suffering. Lastly, intervention for
or civil war of a mahumanitarian reasons in the internal affairs
66
war.
major
a
provoke
might
jor power
Different authors within the just war tradition give varying
degrees of weight to these factors which caution against intervention. They generally conclude, however, that, provided the
other just war criteria are met, 67 humanitarian motives can jus65 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:
TORICAL

A MORAL

ARGUMENT WITH His-

ILLUSTRATIONS 90-91 (1977). Those just war theorists who accept the lib-

eral commitment to self-determination as one of the most significant factors in
human well-being, also tend to see outside intervention in the affairs of a community as paternalistic and contrary to the community's right to self-determination.
See PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 22.
66 REGAN, supra note 9, at 69-70. Cf. PHILLIPS, note 45, at 21 ("states ought
not to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states for three reasons: (1) such intrusions risk escalation to nuclear war, (2) they impede the establishment of an international order, and (3) they abrogate the obligation of peoples to sort out their own
political and social problems.").
67 This caveat is extremely important and raises numerous issues about proportionality (See infra notes 120-130 and accompanying texts), prospect of success
(See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text), last resort (See infra notes 131140 and accompanying text), and perhaps most importantly proper authority (See
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tify war, at least in cases of what one author calls "supreme humanitarian emergencies," 68 i.e., extreme violations of human
rights, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. 6 9
3.

Preemption

Treating defense as the only just cause for war and equating first use of force with aggression, closes the door on preemptive use of force. By contrast, since the time of Augustine, the
just war tradition has accepted, at least implicitly, the use of
70
force to preempt an imminent unjust attack.
The Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who played
a pivotal role in the development of just war theory, explicitly
approved preemptive strikes, finding justification for war in "an
injury not yet inflicted, which menaces either persons or property." He was quick, however, to clarify that the "danger [of being attacked] must be immediate," 71 and criticized as "much
mistaken" those who hold that "any degree of fear ought to be a
ground for killing another, to prevent his supposed intention." 72
According to Grotius, preemptive attacks are justified only
when it is certain that the other party will attack. 73 He rejects
as sufficient grounds for war "fear with respect to a neighboring
power... for in order that a self-defence may be lawful it must
be necessary; and it is not necessary unless we are certain, not
only regarding the power of our neighbor, but also regarding his
intention; the degree of certainty required is that which is accepted in morals." 74 Grotius criticizes as "repugnant to every
infra notes 89-115 and accompanying text). The issue of proper authority raises
the question of who is authorized to carry out such interventions: single states,
coalitions of states, or only the United Nations.
68 WHEELER, supra note 62, at 34.
69 See, e.g., PAUL RAMSEY, JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
19-41 (1968). Phillips, supra note 45, at 21-22 (1984); David M. Barnes, Intervention and the Just War Tradition, available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/
JSCOPEOO/BarnesOO.html; RICHARD supra note 9, at 72-73; JAMES A. BARRY, THE
SWORD OF JUSTICE: ETHICS AND COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

80-87 (1998);

POTTER, supra note 18, at 202-203.
70 See JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF

WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 30 (1981).
71 Id. at 63.
72 Id.
73

See Johnson, supra note 21, at 13-14.

74 GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 549 (A.C. Campbell trans., James

Brown Scott, ed., 1925). He goes on to say: "We can in no wise approve the view of
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principle of justice" the doctrine that "the bare possibility that
violence may be some day turned on us gives us the right to
inflict violence on others."7 5 It is not permissible, he urges, "to
take up arms in order to weaken a 76rising power, which, if it
grew too strong, might do us harm."
Later authors within the just war tradition, building on
Grotius' insights, distinguished between preempting an attack
which was certain and imminent, and launching a preventive
attack to head off a danger, which was feared might develop in
the future if measures were not taken now. A preventive attack, they said, could not be justified,7 7 because "the danger to
which it alludes is not only distant but speculative, whereas the
costs of a preventive war are near, certain, and usually terrible."7 But a genuinely preemptive attack could be justified in
the "rare circumstances . . . when an unavoidable attack is
likely to be imminent and the threat is grave."7 9 Walzer, for
those who declare that it is a just cause of war when a neighbor who is restrained
by no agreement builds a fortress on his own soils ... which may some day cause
us harm." Id.
75 See id. at 184.
76 See GROTIUS, supra note 74, at 184.
77 See, e.g., COATES, supra note 4, at 159-160. Writing in 1960, and presumably thinking about massive nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, Tucker described
official and popular American opinion as totally opposed to preventive war: "A policy of preventive war, the prevailing official and private sentiment has insisted,
scarcely bears discussion, since from every point of view it must be seen as immoral and wicked." See Tucker, supra note 44, at 105. More recently the former
Catholic Archbishop of Denver, Cardinal James Francis Stafford, addressing the
situation in Iraq, insisted that a war could be justified only by a threat that is
"clear, active and present, not future." Cardinal J. Francis Stafford, The Prospect
of War Between Iraq and the United States, NAT'L CATHOLIC REPORTER, available
at http://www.natcath.org/NCR Online/documents/stafford.htm; Cardinal Edward
Egan of New York echoed that analysis in declaring - again with reference to Iraq
- that no war "may be declared or pursued without clear and certain knowledge of
clear and certain danger." John Norton, CardinalEgan Says Inspectors Must Determine if Iraq War is Justified, NC Catholic Online-Catholic News Service Jan.
30, 2003 available at http://www.nccatholic.org/news.php?ArtID=786 (quoting Cardinal Edward Egan, Statement during intercontinental web cast organized by the
Vatican, Jan. 28, 2003).
78 Michael Walzer, No Strikes: Inspectors Yes, War No, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 19.
79 John Kelsey, Just War: The Details, CHICAGO TRIBUNE Nov. 10, 2002 at Cl;
See also OREND, supra note 54, at 190-192 (empirically offensive tactics may be
justified as a response to a credible, grave, and imminent threat for which there is
compelling evidence.); AmericanValues.org, Pre-emption, Iraq, and Just War: A
Statement of Principles, Nov. 14, 2002, available at http://www.americanvalues.
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instance, asserts that a preemptive strike may be justified when
there is
a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that
makes the intent a positive danger, and a general situation in
which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly
magnifies the risk.... Instead of previous signs of rapacity and
ambition, current and particular signs are required; instead of an
"augmentation of power," actual preparation for war; instead of
the refusal of future securities, the intensification of present
danger.8 0
Regan agrees, "it is as much an act of self-defense to initiate
hostilities to prevent imminent attack as it is to respond to hostilities already initiated by an aggressor."8 1 He argues that it
not necessary to wait until the would-be aggressor is immediately poised to attack or has stockpiled nuclear or chemical
weapons, but he requires "practical certainty, no reasonable
doubt (better than 90% probability)" that aggression will take
82
place if not preempted.
In recent years, some just war theorists have dedicated special attention to the justification for preemptive attacks to prevent "rogue" states8 3 from acquiring nuclear, biological or
org/htm/lbpre-emption.html ("preemption can be morally justified only in rare
circumstances - when the attack is likely to be imminent, the threat is grave, and
preventive means other than war are unavailable."); William V. O'Brien, The
Challenge of War: A ChristianRealist Perspective, in JUST WAR THEORY 169, 226
(Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992) ("anticipatory self-defense is a legitimate form of
self-defense if there is a clear and present danger of aggression.").
80 See Walzer, supra note 26, at 81. Walzer asserts, however, that aggression,
which justifies preemptive use of force:
[C]an be made out not only in the absence of a military attack or invasion
but in the (probable) absence of any immediate intention to launch such
an attack or invasion. The general formula must go something like this:
states may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the
failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political
independence. .

.

. [T]here are threats with which no nation can be ex-

pected to live. And that acknowledgment is an important part of our understanding of aggression.
Walzer, supra note 26, at 85. On these grounds, Walzer argues that Israel's 1956
attack on Egypt was justified. See id. at 81-85.
81 REGAN, supra note 9, at 51.
82 Id. at 51-52.
83 The practice of justifying special treatment of rogue states began at least as
early as the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan labeled Qaddafi an outlaw. See
Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Les dilemmes de la politique amdricaine vis-d-vis des
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84
chemical weapons of mass destruction. They argue that what
constitutes morally acceptable preemptive use of force must be
revised to take into account the vast destructive force of weapons of mass destruction and the rapidity with which they can
inflict tremendous damage. They assert that these factors, combined with rogue states' lack of respect for common norms of
domestic and international behavior, make it unnecessary, and

'Rogue' States, POLITIQUE ETRANG9RE, Spring 2000 (citing President Ronald Reacan be
gan, 1 PUB. PAPERS 563, May 7, 1986). An English translation of this article
2 0 00
found

at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/osullivar/

spr-

ingIFRI.htm. President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, employed the term rogue states in an influential article in Foreign Affairs, and the
term has since gained wide currency. Cf Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash
States, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 45, 45-55, (1994). In Lake's usage, a rogue state is a country which seeks to challenge the system of international norms and international
order. See id.

The question of preemption has attracted attention not only because of the
Second Gulf War, but also because The National Security Strategy of the United
States, published in Sept. 2002, announced that preemption had become an important part of American strategy:
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no
longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries'
choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies
strike first.
84

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy
whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose
most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that
sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars
and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption
on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's
adversaries.
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions
to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case
for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively.
National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, p. 15.
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indeed in many cases irresponsible, to wait until an attack is
85
imminent.
In addition to disregarding or modifying the requirement of
an immediate threat, the proponents of an expanded justification for the preemptive use of force also invoke threats to stable
85 The most vigorous and prominent proponent of this view is George Weigel,
who has used it to justify the United State's attack on Iraq. Weigel's argument is
worth reproducing at some length:
As recently as the Korean War (and, some would argue, the Vietnam
War), "defense against aggression" could reasonably be taken to mean a
defensive military response to a cross-border military aggression already
underway. New weapons capabilities and outlaw or 'rogue' states require
a development of the concept of "defense against aggression." To take an
obvious current example: it makes little moral sense to suggest that the
United States must wait until a North Korea or Iraq or Iran actually
launches a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapon of mass destruction before we can legitimately do something
about it. Can we not say that, in the hands of certain kinds of states, the
mere possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes an aggression-or, at the very least, an aggression waiting to happen?
This "regime factor" is crucial in the moral analysis, for weapons of mass
destruction are clearly not aggressions waiting to happen when they are
possessed by stable, law-abiding states. No Frenchman goes to bed nervous about Great Britain's nuclear weapons, and no sane Mexican or Canadian worries about a preemptive nuclear attack from the United States.
Every sane Israeli, Turk, or Bahraini, on the other hand, is deeply concerned about the possibility of an Iraq or Iran with nuclear weapons and
medium-range ballistic missiles. If the "regime factor" is crucial in the
moral analysis, then preemptive military action to deny the rogue state
that kind of destructive capacity would not, in my judgment, contravene
the "defense against aggression" concept ofjust cause. Indeed, it would do
precisely the opposite, by giving the concept of "defense against aggression" real traction in the world we must live in, and transform.
George Weigel, Moral Clarity in Time of War, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, 20, 25,
available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft03o/articles/weigel.html. See
also, George Weigel, Pope John XXIII Lecture: The Just War Tradition and the
World After September 11, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 689, 706 (2002); George Weigel,
Just War and Pre-Emption: Three Questions, Oct. 2002 available at http://www.
eppc.org/news/newsID. 1407/newsdetail.asp (Oct. 2, 2002).
Roberts offers an extended discussion of preemption in just war theory. Roberts,
supra note 41, at 83. He argues that acquistion of weapons of mass destruction:
[Clan confirm an intent to injure, create a positive danger, and raise the
risks of waiting.... Their dispersal in time of crisis would certainly signal
preparation for war. But to acquire such weapons and to prepare for thier
use is not the same as . . . 'actual preparation for war' or 'the intensification of present dangers'-these are qualities that have to do with the nature of the regime itself.... Rogue regimes have already established their
aggressive intent-this is the essence of their characterization as "rogue"
or "backlash."
Roberts, supra note 1, at 83.
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world order - rather than to the more immediate interests of a
particular state - as a justification for preemptive strikes. Roberts, for instance, argues that rogue regimes threaten not just
their neighbors but
the order that is the foundation of long-term sovereignty. They
may pose threats to regional peace .... Rogue regimes may also
pose threats to the global order .... [Dlefending the stability of
the [international] system is in the national interest of many
states. The world-order argument thus creates an additional
moral justification8 6for preemption. Protecting world order is longterm self-defense.

Others working within the just war tradition have rejected
this attempt to broaden the circumstances under which a preemptive attack can be justified. A group of professors recently
criticized the Bush administration's adoption of a policy of preemption on the grounds that "within the framework of just war
theory, pre-emption can be morally justified only in rare circumstances - when the attack is likely to be imminent, the
threat is grave, and preventive means other than war are unavailable."8 7 Similarly, Professor Griffiths has criticized those
who expand the definition of imminent threat. He says they are
attempting "to eliminate one of the constraints of just war
theory."8 8
86 Roberts, supra note 41, at 92-94. George Weigel has commented:
International terrorism ... is a deliberate assault, through the murder of
innocents, on the very possibility of order in world affairs. That is why
terror networks must be dismantled or destroyed. The peace of order is
also under grave threat when vicious, aggressive regimes acquire weapons of mass destruction ... That is why there is a moral obligation to rid
the world of this threat to the peace and security of all.
George Weigel, Moral Clarity in Time of War, 128 FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 24
87 Statement by David Blankenhorn, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Francis
Fukuyama, William A. Galston, John Kelsay, Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, Max
L. Stackhouse, and Paul C. Vitz (Nov. 14, 2002) Pre-emption, Iraq, and Just War:
A Statement of Principles, November 14, 2002, at http://www.americanvalues.org/
htm]lbpre-emption.html.
88 Joe Feuerherd, Preemption, Aggression and Catholic Teaching, NATIONAL
CATHOLIC REPORTER, Oct. 25, 2002, available at http://natcath.org/NCROnline/

archives2/2002d/102502/102502a.htm. In a similar vein, Cardinal Stafford, after
summarizing the just war tradition, stressed recently that "legitimate public authority cannot decide for war unless the nation or community of nations has undergone prior damages from an aggressor or is actually under a very imminent
threat." Cardinal J. FrancisStafford, The Prospect of War Between Iraq and the
United States, NAT'L CATHOLIC REPORTER available at http://www.natcath.org/
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The question of preemption is a troubling one and unlikely
to be definitively resolved. It has always involved prudential
judgments about how imminent is imminent enough, but the
pressure on answering those questions correctly has been vastly
increased by the availability of weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, under contemporary conditions, it is inextricably
entwined with the ambiguous position of the United States as a
country which has special responsibilities for maintaining
world order, but which also has parochial interests, which can
easily be cloaked in world-order rhetoric. For this reason, it
raises the question of lawful authority, which is the subject of
the next section.
B.

Lawful Authority

For centuries we have been accustomed to the concept that
war is the province of sovereign states. In revolutionary situations and civil wars we may be uncertain about where to draw
the line between private violence and war, but in most other
situations we distinguish easily between war on the one hand
and brigandage or other forms of private violence on the other.
In the just war tradition, this difference depends on the authority by which war is declared and in whose name it is waged.
During the middle ages, the requirement that war be
waged by, "authority of the sovereign," 8 9 reflected above all the
need to keep minor nobles and their private armies from waging
wars that led to social chaos. 90 "Peace among mortals," says
Aquinas quoting Augustine, "demands that the power to declare
and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the
supreme authority."9 1
The foundations of the requirement that war be waged only
by sovereigns was not, however, merely pragmatic. It reflected
NCR Online/documents/stafford.htm (Posted February 11, 2003). Professor John
Kelsey argues that even in the contemporary world, "pre-emption can be morally
justified only in rare circumstance-when an unavoidable attack is likely to be
imminent and the threat is grave." John Kelsey, Just War: The Details, CHICAGO
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2002, at Cl.
89 THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 10, II, II, q. 40, a. 1.
90 See ALLEN, supra note 53, at 38.
91 THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 10, II, II, q. 40, a. 1, quoting AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUST. xxii, 75.
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what Johnson has called "the moral component of authority.
As one author has put it:

92

The state's right to war derives not from its de facto or 'coercive'
sovereignty... but from its membership of an international community to the common good of which the state is ordered and to
the law of which it is subject .... [TIo be authoritative [a state's]
act of war must retain a public and legal character .... When
states employ force in defense of their particular interests they
are justified in so doing only to the extent that, at the same time,
their actions can be convincingly construed as a defense of the
order and a securing of the international common
international
93
good.

Beginning in the 17th century, this moral conception of just
authority was lost from view and became "entirely subordinated
94 Just authority was disto the concept of state sovereignty."
placed by competence de guerre, seen as a "formal requirement
95 Authors working
or accompaniment of state sovereignty."
within the just war tradition mentioned the requirement of just
authority, but gave it little importance.
In recent decades, three factors have refocused attention on
the requirement of lawful authority: 1) the increasing importance of intra-state conflict; 2) the desire to eliminate or lessen
the frequency of armed conflict between states by limiting the
right to use force to the United Nations; and 3) the growing importance of humanitarian intervention.
The period since the end of World War II has been marked
by frequent and often highly destructive armed conflict within
92 JOHNSON, supra note 70 at 170. Aquinas, for instance, writes:
[A]s the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have
recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal
disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the
Apostle (Rm. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is
their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in
authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the
hand of the sinner.
THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 10, II, II, q. 40, a. 1.
93 COATES, supra note 4, at 126-27.
94 Id. at 125.
95 Id. at 126.
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countries. As early as 1993, the increasing importance of internal conflict compared to external or interstate warfare led the
distinguished military historian John Keegan to conclude that
the most important future wars would consist of"a fight for civilization - against ethnic bigots, regional warlords, ideological
intransigents, common pillagers and organized international
96
criminals."
We seem to be returning in some sense to the situation of
the Middle Ages in which it was not possible to take for granted
the public monopoly on the use of force. 9 7 This lends new urgency to the requirement of lawful authority as a means of distinguishing private violence from legitimate uses of armed force
to protect the common good of society. 98
The contemporary trend toward limiting just cause for war
to defense against armed invasion 9 9 is intimately linked to the
question of just authority. In fact, although the discussion of
defensive war is usually cast in terms of just cause, all just war
theorists - and indeed all non-pacifists - concede that the
United Nations is justified in using armed force in other situations. This suggests that the real question is not whether only
96 Id.

at 125.

97 Id.
98 It would be easy to convert the requirement of lawful authority into a justi-

fication for government violence against all efforts to change the social order by
imposing on the opponents of established governments impossibly high burdens of
legitimacy, and there can be no doubt that the requirement has been so used by
social conservatives. See, e.g., FARER, supra note 37, at 48-51. (criticizing McDougal and Feliciano for in practice denying legitimacy to all revolutionary movements). On the other hand, advocates of revolutionary change easily dismiss the
requirement of lawful authority and attribute to all revolutionary groups a degree
of legitimacy which they may often lack. See, e.g., COATES, supra note 4 at 137-39.
(criticizing Farer and other proponents of liberation theology for their willingness
to grant legitimacy to revolutionary movements which in fact have little popular
support). The difficult issue of the justification for the use of violence in revolutionary situations and specifically the question of when revolutionaries can be considered to represent a lawful authority falls outside the scope of this essay, and to
a significant degree outside the province of just war theory. Just war theory's requirement of lawful authority does, however, at least indicate that in addition to
considering the tactics employed in efforts to overthrow or sustain established governments (terrorism and counter-terrorism, attacks on civilians, etc.), it is necessary to consider the degree to which both established governments and
revolutionary groups actually represent the society they purport to lead and can
rightfully claim that their use of violence is a public one directed toward the common good.
99 See supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
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defense justifies the use of armed force, but rather whether individual states are justified in using force in any other
circumstance.
Thinkers within the just war tradition differ with each
other over the moral value of the prohibition against the use of
armed force by individual states outside the context of immediate self-defense. Their differences reflect, above all, the degree
of their commitment to moving toward a new international order in which war between states would be an anachronism. In
some ways, the current debate about who has the authority to
wage war outside cases of defense against armed aggression is
reminiscent of the medieval debate over who could rightly declare and wage war. The argument of medieval just war thinkers that only the sovereign could rightly wage war reflected an
aspiration rather than a political fact. So too, today, those who
argue that individual states may not morally have recourse to
armed force except in self-defense base their position more on a
desire to see the United Nations become an effective guardian of
peace and justice between nations than on a conviction that it is
in fact such an institution. 100 On the other hand, those who argue that individual nations may morally have recourse to
armed force in a broader range of circumstances tend to highlight the defects and shortcomings of the UN as it exists today.10 1 The debate over the proper role of the United Nations,
100 In 1983, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops argued that:
Just as the nation-state was a step in the evolution of government at a
time when expanding trade and new weapons technologies made the feudal system inadequate to manage conflicts and provide security, so we are
now entering an era of new, global interdependencies requiring global systems of governance to manage the resulting conflicts and ensure our common security.
See

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF CATHOLIC

GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE:

A

BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:

PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR AND PEACE

101

(1983). See also MURRAY, S.J., supra note 47, 252-53, (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992)
(explaining that the focus of Pius XII's statements on war is much less to determine what might be just in the actual situation of an unorganized humanity than
to promote a genuine international organization capable of eliminating war, because the juridical reason for the right of war is the unorganized state of international life).
101 See, e.g., Weigel, supra note 85, at 26. ("the manifest inability of the UN to
handle large-scale international security questions suggests that assigning a
moral veto over U.S. military action on these fronts to the Security Council would
be a mistake."); Eugene V. Rostow, Competent Authority Revisited, in CLOSE
CALLS: INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND 'JUST WAR' TODAY 39, 59
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and of individual states and groups of states, has focused during
the last decade primarily on preemption 1 02 and humanitarian
1 03
intervention.
Regarding preemption of threats to international order, the
justification for forcible UN action is relatively clear. The more
difficult issue is whether individual countries - and concretely
the United States - can justifiably respond with armed force
when there is no immediate threat to their particular interests.
As one author has put it, with regard to preemptive attacks by
the United States on "rogue states," the question is: "[W]hat
makes it America's fight?" 10 4
Authors working within the just war tradition have given
sharply contrasting answers to this question. George Weigel
asserts: "The United States has a unique responsibility for leadership in the war against terrorism and the struggle for world
order; that is not a statement of hubris but of empirical fact.
That responsibility may have to be exercised unilaterally on
10 5
occasion."
Roberts, on the other hand, although recognizing that the
US has a unique role to play in defending peace and international order, notes that it is also the prime beneficiary of maintaining the status quo.10 6 When it portrays itself as engaging in
"preemptive actions with a world-order purpose," others will be
tempted to believe that "though wrapped in world-order rhetoric, [those actions] are in the service of primarily U.S. interests." 10 7 Therefore, he concludes that the United States cannot
claim to have the moral authority to act unilaterally for the
good of the international community.
(Elliott Abrams ed., 1998) (arguing in favor of reliance in the quest for peace on
regional groupings of states and ad hoc alliances rather than on the UN on the
grounds that the "quest of peace must continue, but on a more realistic legal footing, one compatible with the nature of the state system as it has evolved
historically.")
102 See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
104 Roberts, supra note 41, at 97.
105 Weigel, supra note 85, at 26. Weigel acknowledges that "Defining the
boundaries of unilateral action while defending its legitimacy under certain circumstances is one crucial task for a developing just war tradition." Id. In practice,
however, he seems much more interested in defending the legitimacy of unilateral
US action than in defining its boundaries.
106 Roberts, supra note 41, at 97-98.
107 Id. at 98.
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Roberts suggests that UN approval should be required for
preemptive actions that involve protecting the international
community or a region rather than the defense of the US or of
countries to which the US is bound by treaty. He is aware of
the obvious shortcomings of the UN, but he argues that, "its
normative attributes redress the competent-authority
shortfall," 08 because it "aspires to represent the interests of the
whole community of nations" 10 9 and thus has "strong moral authority in purporting to defend those interests." 110 He suggests
that endorsement by a majority of the Security Council - even if
one or more vetoes prevent approval - would greatly bolster the
moral case for a specific act of preemption.1"
The question of lawful authority is also raised by humanitarian interventions, which have attracted increasing attention
during the last decade. There can always be some international
spillover from acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other massive violations of human rights, and that spillover may give rise
to a plausible claim by one or more neighboring states that intervention is called for on grounds of an expanded concept of
self-defense. If humanitarian crises are considered in themselves, however, they represent a call to the international community, but not to any single country in particular, to intervene
in defense of human rights. Many international lawyers contend that no individual state has authority to intervene on its
own to solve a humanitarian crisis."1 2 Others, however, con108 Id. at 102.
109 Id. at 101.
110 Id. at 101-102.
Cf Daniel Brennan, No Just War Outside the Law, THE
Feb. 22, 2003, available at http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/archivedb.
cgi?tablet-00711 (arguing that wars can legitimately be undertaken to preserve
international peace and security only with the support of the international community expressed through the Security Council). In the case of a specific threat to the
US or one its allies, Roberts is more willing to dispense with any requirement of
UN approval on grounds that self- defense is an inherent right of sovereign states.
See Roberts, supra note 41, at 104. Relying on a similar distinction, Falk distinguishes the U.S.'s attack on Afghanistan, which can be plausibly justified in terms
111 See id. at 102.

TABLET,

of self-defense, from its attack on Iraq, which he considers to have no such justification. See RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 119-120 (2003).
112 See Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality, and the Dilemma of HumanitarianIntervention after Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 322, 325 (2002), available at http:l
www.ejil.org/journal/Voll3/Nol/brl.pdf (citing S.D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1996)); M. PAPE, HUMANITARE INTERVENTION (1996); WHEELER, supra

note 62.

SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTER-
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tend that state practice during the last decade constitutes an
1 13
acceptance of unilateral intervention.
The disagreement between those who argue that humanitarian interventions by individual states are permissible and
those who reject them is often presented as a clash between
those who value human rights more highly than state sovereignty and those who defend sovereignty even in the face of
massive violations of human rights. 114 In fact, however, the dispute involves not so much differing estimates of the importance
of human rights as contrasting assessments of who has authority to intervene to protect those rights. A fairly widespread consensus exists that the United Nations can properly intervene in
severe humanitarian crises.1 1 5 The dispute as to whether unilateral intervention is also justified thus seems to involve not so
much a clash between human rights and sovereignty (which
would be violated equally by a UN-backed intervention) as a
clash between human rights and the peace and international
order which would be placed in danger by admitting a right to
6
unilateral humanitarian intervention."
A final question about lawful authority with regard to humanitarian intervention is the status of interventions carried
out by groups of countries without the formal sanction of the
United Nations." 7 In light of the difficulty of obtaining Security Council approval of armed interventions in humanitarian
crises, some authors believe that groups of states may be justified in intervening even if a single state would not be justified
in doing so.' 1 Certainly the participation of a sufficiently large
VENTION AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(2001); and

LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000).
113 See Krisch supra note 112, at

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL

325 (citing F.K. ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF
(1999)).

THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
114 See Krisch, supra note 112, at 329.

115 See id. at 331 (citing Frowein and Krisch, 'Article 39', in THE CHARTER OF
(B. SIMMA ET AL. EDS., 2002).
116 See id. at 331. Hehir argues that "[i]n a revised ethic of intervention, multilateral authorization should be the norm." Hehir, supra note 58, at 9.
117 The best-known case is, of course, NATO's intervention in Kosovo, which
was subsequently ratified by Security Council Resolution 1244. See S.C. Res.
1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
118 See Brennan, supra note 111, quoting Antonio Casesse as maintaining that
there is "an emerging consensus in international law" that such interventions are
justified when the Security Council has failed to take action to stop crimes against
humanity committed by a state, when all peaceful means to solve the crisis have
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/1

34

2004] AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUST WAR TRADITION 255
and diverse group of states assuages some of the concerns
caused by unilateral intervention and offers some guarantees
that the intervention is actually prompted by humanitarian
concerns rather than narrow national interests. The stress
here, however, should be on diversity. Although an intervention backed by NATO is certainly somewhat less suspect than
one backed only by the United States, if that intervention takes
place in, for example, an oil-rich Muslim country, there may
still be considerable grounds for suspicion about the bona fides
of the proffered humanitarian justification.
C. Proportionality
For a war to be justified, there must be a proportional relationship between the good to be achieved and the costs of the
war. This might seem at first to be simply a common sense observation that one should undertake only actions whose expected benefits exceed their expected costs. Within the just war
tradition, however, several factors make the principle more interesting and less obvious. In the first place, the global outlook,
which characterizes the just war tradition, requires taking into
account the costs and benefits to all belligerents (not merely to
oneself) and even the costs and benefits to the international
community. 1 19 In addition, the calculation should take into account not merely material benefits (recovery of lost territories,
control of resources, etc.) and costs (money, physical deaths, destruction of property), but also the moral benefits (protection of
freedom, the way of life of a people, religious values, etc.) and
moral costs (the curtailment of the rights of citizens, the inevitable crimes and injustices that every war entails, the disruption of family life, the forcing of ordinary citizens to take up
1 20
arms against other human beings).
been exhausted, the force used is proportionate to remedy the wrong, and the
group of intervening states has the actual or tacit support of most countries.
119 See COATES, supra note 4, at 179. See also OREND, supra note 26, at 61.;
O'Brien, supra note 79, at 227-28.
120 See Murray, S.J., supra note 47, at 255-56 (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992)

holding:
The standard is not a "eudaemonism and utilitarianism of materialist origin' which would avoid war merely because it is uncomfortable, or connive
at injustice simply because its repression would be costly. The question of
proportion must be evaluated in more tough-minded fashion, from the
viewpoint of the hierarchy of strictly moral values. It is not enough sim-
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Although some authors list "probability of success" as an
12 1 it
independent criterion for judging whether a war is just,
can also be thought of as part of proportionality. 12 2 There does
not seem to be any practical difference between the two approaches. If the goals a nation wishes to pursue have little or
no chance of being achieved through a war, they can hardly jus1 23
tify the physical and moral costs of the war.
In considering probability of success a nation may legitimately weigh not only the likelihood of military victory, but also
factors such as "witnessing to values."124 On the other hand,
military victory may not necessarily equate to success if military victory does not lead to achieving the objectives of the
25
war.1
ply to consider the 'sorrows and evils that flow from war." There are
greater evils than the physical death and destruction wrought in war.
And there are human goods of so high an order that immense sacrifices
may have to be borne in their defense.
Id.
121 See, e.g., OREND, supra note 26, at 196.
122 See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 53, at 42.
123 See COATES supra note 4, at 179. ("[I1f the prospects of military success are
extremely slim or remote,. . . [t]he harm that war inflicts will ..
, it seems, not
only outweigh the good to be obtained, but will be wholly without the moral compensation afforded by a potential benefit."); See also James F. Childress, Just-War
Theories: The Bases, Interrelations,Priorities,and Functions of Their Criteria,in
WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 256, 264 (Malham M. Wakin ed.,

1986).
124 Childress, supra note 123, at 265. See also OREND, supra note 26, at 196197. ("There may also be considerations of self-respect that come into play in this
criterion, according to which victims of aggression ought to be permitted at least
some resistance, should they decide to do so, as an expression of their strong objection to the aggression and as an affirmation of their rights"); A.C. Grayling, Fighting is a Last Resort; Aquinas Defined the Just War: Few Conflicts Have Ever Met
His Criteria,NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 2002, at 10. ("The problem with transforming this prudential consideration [proportionality] into a moral one is that it
seems, by contrast, rather immoral, not to say spineless, to avoid engaging in an
otherwise just war because it threatens to be too costly. When the Polish cavalry
galloped towards Hitler's Panzers in defense of their homeland, they were going
futilely to war, but their courage gave them a moral victory, and proved an inspiration to others.")
125 The Popes' increasing skepticism about the justification for war other than
in cases of defense against armed aggression already in course, (see supra note 50
and accompanying text), probably responds to their increasing skepticism about
the ability of war to accomplish the long range aims of restoring peace and order.
See William Bole, Bush's 'FirstStrike' Threat: Can It Be Justified? OUR SUNDAY
VISITOR, June 23, 2002, at http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstocklpublications/articlel8.htm.
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Judgments regarding proportionality and probability of
success can be analyzed into four elements: (1) value judgments
about the worth of the goals to be pursued in the war; (2) factual
judgments about the war's probable costs in terms of casualties
and economic and physical costs; (3) factual and value judgments about the war's probable moral costs: and (4) a value
judgment about the balance between the goals to be pursued
12 6
and the likely costs.
Many of these judgments will be fraught with uncertainty.
In August 1914, for instance, no one would have thought that
the conflict we have come to call World War I would lead to 8.5
million soldiers killed, 21 million wounded and, 6.5 million civilian deaths. 12 7 This is one of the reasons why proportionality is
a factor to be considered not only at the moment of deciding
whether to go to war, but needs to be reassessed throughout the
28
conflict.'
Even if the facts could be clearly known, it would always be
difficult to weigh the goals being sought against the economic,
physical and moral costs of war. The difficulty of making these
judgments is not, however, unique. Much statesmanship and
many ordinary moral judgments involve similarly difficult
tasks. 29 Just war thinkers admit the difficulty of making good
judgments in this area, but argue that:
it is better to calculate consequences the best we can, however
imperfectly, than not to do so at all. People are apparently guided
by that belief in private life. We often ask of an act, like changing
126 See REGAN supra note 9, at 63 (1996). ("Due proportion involves three elements: (1) a value judgment about the worth of the cause that purports to justify
recourse to war; (2) factual judgments about the war's likely casualties and costs;
(3) a value judgment about the proportional worth of the war's cause in relation to
its likely casualties and costs.") Regan's three-element test could easily be read to
count only the casualties and economic costs of war, but within the just war tradition, moral costs must also be taken into account.
127 See Military Casualties of World War One, at http://www.firstworldwar.
com/features/casualties.htm (last visited February 12, 2004).
128 Walzer points out that in the course of a war, even the ends sought may
change, and that there is a tendency to "redefine initially narrow goals in order to
fit the available military forces and technologies." WALZER, supra note 16, at 120.
He argues that in assessing proportionality, it "is necessary to hold ends constant,"
but admits that this is difficult to do. Id.
129 As Orend observes, "[j]udgments about the worth of desired ends, and the
costs of the means of achieving those ends, are of the very essence of practical
rationality." OREND, supra note 26, at 198.
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jobs, or buying a car, or enlisting in the military, "What might
happen if we do that?" Best that we do ask that, even though our
130
forecasts are far from perfect.

D. Last Resort
The just war criterion of last resort expresses "the primacy
of peace over war in just war thinking."13 1 It requires nations to

assess "all means available to meet a particular threat," and to
choose among "those deemed sufficient to do so [giving] a prefer130 ALLEN,

supra note 53, at 48.

131 COATES, supra note 4, at 189. See Lisa Sowle Cahill, ChristianJust War

Tradition, in TENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, IN THE RETURN OF THE JUST WAR 74,
78-79 (Aquino, et. al. eds., 2001). ("The presumption against war is suggested by
St. Thomas' title of his discussion of war, 'Is it Always a Sin to Wage War?' The
very prospect of war is introduced as an offense against Christian love, which is
why it is taken up in his treatise on charity. His statement of the problem creates
a strong presumption against going to war as a way to resolve social problems, for
he implies that war is usually a sin.")
In 1983, the American Catholic Bishops wrote: "The Church's teaching on war and
peace establishes a strong presumption against war which is binding on all; it then
examines when this presumption may be overridden, precisely in the name of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights." Id.
The bishops not only stress the presumption against war. They assert that it
"stands at the beginning of just-war teaching." The U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter
on War and Peace, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,
para. 70. (1983), available at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/cp.htm. During the debate
on the war in Iraq, Weigel and other just war theorists who favored the war vigorously criticized the bishops for asserting that the just war tradition begins with a
presumption against war, arguing that the just war tradition begins with a presumption not against war but in favor of justice - which may be advanced by war.
See George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 20,
22-23.
It is abundantly clear that the just war tradition views war as something to be
avoided - although not at all costs - and thus contains a rebuttable presumption
against war. If there were no presumption against war, there would be no need for
a theory to justify it under certain circumstances. Weigel himself had written earlier that "the presumption is always for peace, and the burden of moral reasoning
lies with those who argue for the justness of a particular resort to war." GEORGE
WEIGEL, TRANQUILLITAS ORDINis: THE PRESENT FAILURE AND FUTURE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE 37 (1987). Possibly the debate

over whether this presumption lies at the beginning of just war theory reflects a
conviction that the bishops and others who talk about the presumption against
war as the starting point of just war theory give the presumption so much weight
that it is in fact unrebuttable, thus turning just war theory into a closet form of
pacifism.
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it requires
ence [to] means other than war. ' 132 Put negatively,
33
that war be the "option least to be preferred."'
The last resort criterion does not mean that nations may
have recourse to war only when no other possible alternative is
available. Understood in that fashion, last resort would mean
that war is never justified since one can never say that every
alternative has already been tried.' 34 Neither does the last resort criterion mean that nations may morally go to war only "as
the terminal point of a lengthy series of nonmilitary alternatives."

35

The criterion of last resort "requires a considered

judgment about whether some imagined alternative has a good
chance of avoiding war. It does not require that every idea actually be pursued to the end of the line."

36

To express this idea,

it
one author has proposed renaming the criterion and calling
37
force.'
to
recourse
precipitate
the
avoid
to
the requirement
In deciding whether to go to war or try some other alternative, nations will need to consider the potential costs of waiting.
For example, it is clear in hindsight that Britain and France
See Roberts, supra note 1, at 83.
Michael Quinlan, The Just War Litmus Test, THE TABLET, at http://thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/archive-db.cgi?tablet-00571 (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). As
Coates puts it, "a just recourse to war should be marked by a sense of moral tragedy." COATES, supra note 4, at 189. See John Paul II, Address to the Diplomatic
Corps, Jan. 13, 2003, section 4. (war is always "a defeat for humanity,") at http:ll
www.vatican.va/holy father/johnpaul ii/speeches/2003/january/documents/hfjpii-spe_20030113_diplomatic-corps en.html. Some authors suggest that the criterion of last resort applies only to the party that initiates the war. A country that
has been invaded has, they say, an immediate right of armed resistance. See, e.g.,
John Lanagan, The Just-War Theory after the Gulf War, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
95, 98 (Mar. 1992). This approach seems to be based on an understanding of last
resort as a chronological criterion.
134 See OREND, supra note 26, at 194. In recent years, a number of avowed
pacifists have criticized US actions on grounds that its resort to war was not the
last resort. In the hands of a pacifist, however, last resort is a purely rhetorical
weapon, since the pacifist believes that war is never justified. Within just war
theory, war may be justified if it is the last resort in the sense explained above and
the other just war criteria are satisfied. See COATES, supra note 4, at 194-95.
135 Ramesh Ponnuru, Just Carter, NAT'L REVIEW, Mar. 10, 2003.
136 ALLEN, supra note 53 at 39. See REGAN, supra note 9, at 64. ("Nations are
not justified in resorting to war as long as they have reasonable hope that means
short of war can prevent or rectify wrong .... [Other means] may offer a reasonable alternative to war. The key word is reasonable, and [other means] will be a
reasonable alternative to war only if nations wronged or about to be wronged have
probable cause to believe that [the other means] will lead to the prevention or rectification of the wrong, not merely that [they] may do so.")
137 See OREND, supra note 54, at 195.
132
133
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should have challenged Hitler much earlier than they did, and
that doing so would have avoided or greatly lessened the scope
and intensity of the ensuing war.138 In our own time, many just
war theorists consider that the probability that an opponent
will acquire and eventually use weapons of mass destruction
must be weighed in deciding whether further delay is
1 39
appropriate.
It is also necessary to weigh not only the probability of success, but also the human costs of apparently non-violent alternatives to war, especially economic sanctions. Although
economic sanctions do not involve the dramatic violence of war,
they are a more subtle form of violence that may result in as
many deaths as a war.140
IV.

Ius

IN BELLO: THE JUST CONDUCT OF WAR

If something so horrible as a war is justified at all, it may
seem counterintuitive to impose limits on what can be done to
win it. General Sherman responded to the critics of his tactics
of indiscriminate destruction in the course of his march to the
sea: "If the people raise a howl about my barbarity and cruelty,
I will answer war is war .... War is cruelty, and you cannot
refine it." 14 Air Marshall Harris, who was responsible for Britain's bombing of German cities, adopted much the same tone in
his own defense: "There was nothing to be ashamed of, except in
the sense that everybody might be ashamed of the sort of thing
1 42 Yet
that has to be done in every war, as of war itself."
the
very fact that Sherman and Harris felt obliged to defend themSee COATES, supra note 4, at 190-92.
139 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying texts. See Roberts, supra note 1,
at 87. (Discussing the potential costs of waiting until weapons of mass destruction
have been acquired).
140 See OREND, supra note 54, at 195. A recent UNICEF study concluded that
"if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout Iraq during the 1980s
had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer
deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998." Press release, UNICEF Information Newsline: Iraq Survey
Shows Humanitarian Emergency, U.N Doc. CF/DOC/PR/1999/29 (Aug. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm. While not all the increased mortality of children and infants was due to economic sanctions, a significant proportion probably was.
141 See COATES, supra note 4, at 27.
142 See id.
138
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selves against criticism testifies to a widespread sense that
even in the midst of a war, moral restraints are called for. That
enshrined
sense underlies the just war tradition and has been
143
war.
of
conduct
the
governing
in international law
There are two principle restraints on how war may be
waged: 1) the immunity of civilians from direct attack, and 2)
the principle of proportionality. They will be discussed in subsections A and B.
A.

Civilian Immunity/Principle of Discrimination

The most important limitation on the way in which war
may be waged is usually referred to in just war theory as civilian immunity. In modern international law, it is known as the
principle of discrimination. It prohibits direct attacks on civilians or, more exactly, on noncombatants.
When just war theory was taking shape in the Middle Ages,
civilian immunity from direct attack was reflected in codes of
chivalry and customary practices. It was based less on moral
arguments than on the nature of warfare, which consisted at
the time primarily of combat between heavily-armored mounted
knights and their supporting infantry. There was little or no
military advantage to be gained by attacking anyone other than
and anyone who did so was
the knights and their retainers,
144
viewed as lacking in chivalry.
In the early modern period, when international law began
to take shape as something distinct from theology and cannon
law, civilian immunity continued to be based on the nature of
warfare, which consisted at the time of struggles between professional armies who fought each other in wars of maneuver.
Armies were typically isolated from the larger society, and the
wars they fought were generally perceived as contests between
143 The Hague Convention of 1907 states: "The right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, art. 22, 36 Stat 2277, T.
S. 539, 1 Bevans 63. Half a century later, Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of
1949 reiterated the same idea in almost identical language: "In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose means or methods of warfare
is not unlimited." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 19.
144 See O'Brien, supra note 79, at 143, 169; ADENEY, supra note 14, at 39.
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princes rather than struggles between whole societies. 14 5
Under these conditions, there was little incentive to attack

civilians. 146
All of this changed radically with the advent of modern total warfare, which mobilizes entire societies for war and draws
on all available resources for struggles that are perceived as involving life or death issues for the entire country. Beginning
with the wars of the French Revolution and proceeding through
the American Civil War and World Wars I and II, the lines between combatants and noncombatants were blurred in practice.
Military necessity - or simple military advantage - began to
dictate attacking civilian populations on many occasions. Civilians could no longer rely on utilitarian considerations to protect
them, and violations of civilian immunity became so frequent
and so massive that they called into question the willingness,
and even the ability, of nations involved in modern wars to
spare the lives of noncombatants.
Some authors were led by these developments to assume
that war could no longer be waged effectively without gross systematic violations of the rights of noncombatants.1 47 This led
them to conclude that modern war - at least on a large scale cannot be waged justly and, therefore, to embrace de facto
48
pacifism.'
Despite the frequency and scale of attacks on civilians, the
principle of civilian immunity continues to loom large both in
just war theory and in international law. The theoretical argument in favor of civilian immunity is simple and straightforward. It rests squarely on the principle that it is never
permissible directly to kill or do violence to the innocent. In the
context of just war theory, the relevant sense of innocence is
"not involved in doing violence to others." Combatants may be
justly killed, because they are doing violence to others, or at
least are directly involved in the apparatus which makes it possible for one country to do violence to another. 149 But, as Murphy puts it, one must
145
146
147
148
149

See GEOFFREY BEST, HuMANiTY IN WARFARE 53-67 (1980).
See O'Brien, supra note 79, at 43.
See COATES, supra note 4, at 236.
See id.
See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
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confine one's hostility to those against whom one is defending oneself, i.e. those in the (both causal and logical) chain of command or
responsibility or agency - all those who can reasonably be regarded as engaged in an attempt to destroy you. If one does not
do this, then one cannot be said merely to be defending oneself.
then one acts immorAnd insofar as one is not defending oneself,
150
beings.
human
fellow
one's
ally in killing
Just war theorists agree that even under conditions of modern warfare, there are people who should be considered noncombatants. At a minimum, infants, the elderly, and people who
spend their time caring for them, are excluded from the category of those against whom a society may defend itself because
they are engaged in attacking it. A decrepit old man may write
letters that help keep up the morale of his grandson in the
army, but just war theorists reject the contention that his conclose to make him a
nection with the war effort is sufficiently
15 1
attack.
direct
legitimate object of
This is not to say that combatants are limited to those who
carry weapons or even to those in uniform. "Civilians can be
combatants as well as soldiers, not in the sense that they engage in actual fighting, but in the sense that they provide the
1 52 Munitions workers and
means and instruments of combat."
civilians, who perform tasks like transporting war material that
soldiers would otherwise have to perform, qualify as
15 3
combatants.
What about the farmer who grows crops, some of which are
used to feed soldiers? Regan argues that it is legitimate to attack workers producing any type of supplies for the army, even
150 See Murphy supra note 6, at 350, The Killing of the Innocent, in WAR, Mo-

RALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 341, 350 (1986). Nagel expresses the same
idea from a slightly different perspective. Hostile treatment of a person can only
be justified, he says, in terms of "something about that person which makes the
hostile treatment appropriate. Hostility is a personal relation, and it must be
suited to its target. One consequence of this condition will be that certain persons
may not be subjected to hostile treatment in war at all, since nothing about them
justifies such treatment." Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in WAR AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3, 13 (Thomas Nagel, et al. eds., 1974). See also Regan supra note
9, at 87 ("Enemy nationals not engaged in the war or contributing to waging it are
committing no wrong against the victim nation, and so the victim nation has no
just cause to target such nationals.").
151 See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 9, at 91.
152 See COATES, supra note 4, at 237.
153 See, e.g., id.
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if they are ordinary items of consumption such as food, but not
those who produce the same items for civilian consumption.1 5 4
Although the distinction might be workable in some cases-a facility producing Meals Ready to Eat for the Army and a facility
producing baby food-in other cases it would seem quite unworkable: which farmer's grain will be consumed by soldiers and
which by infants?
Most authors adopt a different approach, arguing that
those whose activities merely support life and existence, providing items which would be needed whether the society was at
war or not, should be considered innocent noncombatants who
may not be directly attacked. 15 5 Murphy makes the following
argument:
The enemy can plausibly be expanded to include all those who are
"criminal accomplices".... But it cannot be expanded to include
all those who, like farmers, merely perform actions causally necessary for the attack-just as in domestic law I cannot plead selfdefense if I kill the one (e. g. the wife or mother) who feeds the
man who is engaged in an attempt to kill me. 1 56
Just war theorists disagree in their assessment of where to
draw the line between combatants and noncombatants, but
they agree that the deliberate targeting of noncombatants is immoral. They also agree that certain acts intrinsically involve
See

REGAN, supra note 9, at 90.
See, e.g., ANSCOMBE, supra note 18, at 53; Allen, supra note 55, at 44 ("Noncombatants include all those whose roles are to serve the needs of the person as
person, rather than the needs of military actions as such ....Bakers who deliver
food to an army are noncombatants, because people must eat whether they are in
uniform or not.").
156 See Murphy, supra note 6, at 350. Walzer articulates this position in the
following terms: "The relevant distinction is not between those who work for the
war effort and those who do not, but between those who make what soldiers need
to fight, and those who make what they need to live, like all the rest of us." See
WALZER, supra note 16, at 146. Some authors sympathetic to revolutionary movements expand the range of legitimate targets to include virtually the entire population that does not support the revolution. Charles Curran, for instance, supports
civilian immunity in inter-state conflicts. He believes that modern conventional
warfare between states is at least prima facie immoral because of the frequency
with which it violates civilian immunity. See COATES, supra note 4, at 132 (citing
CURRAN, POLITICS, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 124 (1973)). In revolutionary
situations, however, he condones attacks on peaceable civilians, which he justifies
on grounds that their involvement in supporting and benefiting from unjust social
structures involves "structural violence and makes them "truly combatants" subject to attack. Id. at 133.
154
155
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direct attacks on noncombatants, even though the attackers
may regret injuring the noncombatants. Thus, for example, if a
sniper is barricaded in a house with a number of children, a
decision to blow up the house could not be justified on grounds
that the foreseeable deaths of the children were merely regrettable unintended consequences of an act designed to eliminate
the sniper. One might legitimately call in a sharpshooter to attempt to shoot the sniper, even though there is some danger
that some of the children may be killed or injured, but blowing
up the building is an indiscriminate attack on the children as
well as the sniper. 157 Similarly, the destruction of entire cities

- Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima - involves the deliberate killing of

noncombatants if that term is to
many who must be considered
158
meaning.
retain any
The fact that just war theorists agree on these points, however, does not mean that there is a consensus over whether such
actions can ever be justified. Positions on saturation bombing
of cities and similar tactics depend on whether the person making the judgment considers the prohibition against killing noncombatants an absolute moral norm whose violation can never
be justified, or rather holds that it reflects an important value
which must be given great weight in our deliberations, but
which must on occasion give way to other values. Those who
think that the prohibition against deliberate targeting of noncombatants is absolute and admits no exceptions, conclude that
the deliberate destruction of cities is murder, no matter what

70, at 363.
Ford argues, for instance, that in the obliteration bombing of German cities
during World War II, the military targets the cities contained were "destroyed incithe
dentally, as part of a great civil disaster, rather than vice versa. It is a case of
case
a
of
instead
evil,
the
of
account
good effect coming with or better after and on
where the evil is incidental to the attainment of the good." John C. Ford, S.J, The
Morality of Obliteration Bombing, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SOURCES
IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 138, 159 (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992). See also G.E.M.
Anscombe, The Justice of the Present War Examined, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH
1992), 134
CENTURY: SOURCES IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 125 (Richard B. Miller ed.,
kill others
to
target,
a
persons
of
group
("it is a different thing, while making one
them
attacking
by
order
in
target,
a
persons
of
group
a
make
to
and
by accident,
legitimately
may
who
persons
are
who
all - to attack some members of the group
be attacked. [.]..The second involves murder and is not an example of double
effect.").
157 See Johnson, supra note
158
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the circumstances.1 59 Those who hold that the protection of innocent human life is only one value-albeit an extraordinarily
important and basic one-weigh the values at stake in each case
and form their opinion accordingly,160 rejecting deliberate attacks on the civilian population in some cases, but justifying
them in others.
Individual theorists' position on the status of the prohibition against killing innocent human beings generally reflects
their views on the basic moral question of whether there are
any actions that are always and everywhere wrong. 16 1 That
question far exceeds the scope of this essay but it is important
to be aware that it explicitly or implicitly underlies much of the
discussion of noncombatant immunity and more generally of
the norms governing the conduct of war. 16 2
159 See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 63-67; COATES, supra note 4, 259-63;
McKEOGH, supra note 20 at 87-90; DONAGAN, supra note 14, at 156-57; Anscombe,
supra note 53, at 240. ANSCOMBE'S position is all the more striking in that she
defended it publicly in England during World War II despite intense public pressure to support Britain's war against Germany war and despite her own moral
repugnance for Nazi Germany.
160 See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 79, at 44-50; TUCKER, supra note 44, at 88-92
(1960) (arguing that the aims sought in a war determine what means are permissible. Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot "be criticized on moral
grounds, if the purpose of unconditional surrender is once sanctioned." Id. at 91,
n.83); James P. Sterba, Reconciling Pacifistsand Just War Theorists, in JUST WAR,
NONVIOLENCE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: PHILOSOPHERS on War and Peace 35
(Duane L. Cady & Werner Richard eds., 1991); Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre,
in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 at 16-17 (Marshall Cohen, et. al. eds, 1974).
161 See REGAN, supra note 9, at 92.
162 Perhaps the most interesting defense from a natural law and Christian perspective of the existence of absolute moral prohibitions is John Paul II's encyclical
Veritatis splendor. John Paul II, Veritatis splendor (Aug. 6, 1993) available at
http ://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john paul ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii enc
_06081993_veritatis-splendor en.html. See also, CHARLES E. RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS ON NATURAL LAw (1999). Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics offer a somewhat different path to the conclusion that there are acts which we may not perform
no matter how good the consequences they may bring. See IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT [Critique of Practical Reason] (Mary J. Gregor ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1997) (1788). The conclusion that there are no absolute moral prohibitions, most frequently responds to a consequentialist ethic which
holds that the moral character of an act comes not from the properties of the act
itself but from the consequences it produces. The classical citation for this position
is JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher, ed., 2001). Mill's theory in its
original formulation has been subjected to intense criticism. A well-balanced discussion of the criticisms and of attempts to respond to them in JAMES RACHELS,
THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 90-103 (1986).
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Although the number and severity of the violations committed by many countries during World War IIled some commentators to conclude, in the aftermath of the war, that the
principle of discrimination had disappeared from international

law, 16 3 since the mid-1960's the international community has
strongly reaffirmed its adhesion to the principle.
favor
In 1968, the UN General Assembly voted 111 to 0 in
164 The
of a resolution affirming the principle of discrimination.
principle also forms the nucleus of the 1977 document known to
international lawyers and other specialists in the law of warfare
as Protocol 1.165 This addition to the Geneva Convention has
of the United Nations,
been ratified by 161 of the 191 members
66
States.
United
the
by
not
although

163 Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 401 (1993) (citing CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW

550-551 (4th ed. 1965) and Lester Nurick, The Distinction between Combatant and
Noncombatant in the Law of War, 39 AM. J. INT'L. L. 680 (1945).
164 G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 164, U.N. Doc.
U.N. Doc. A/7128 (1968). reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLEC&
TION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 264 (D. Schindler
J. Toman rev. 3d eds, 1988). The resolution provides "(a) That the right of the

parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; (b) That
it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; (c) That
distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared
as much as possible."
165 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter, Protocol Additional].
In order to insure "respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects," the Protocol Additional requires the Parties to "distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants" and to "direct their operations only against
military objectives." Protocol Additional, art. 48, supra note 165. The Protocol declares that "[tihe civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack." Id. More explicitly, it forbids "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population." Id. In addition, it prohibits "indiscriminate attacks," a category which
includes attacks not directed against a specific military objective, those which use
means that cannot be directed at specific military objectives, and those which
"strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Id.
art. 51, para. 4. Descending to greater detail, the Protocol proscribes as indiscriminate any "attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects. Id. art. 51, para. 5.
166 See International Committee of the Red Cross, "States party to the main
treaties" (includes Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols), at http://
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Neither civilian immunity nor the principle of discrimination is a prohibition of all injury to or killing of civilians. If they
were, there could be no just war because noncombatants will
inevitably be killed in any war. 167 Both just war theory and international law permit the indirect killing of civilians-what we
now refer to with the distastefully sterile term "collateral damage"-subject to the limitations of proportionality which will be
discussed in the next subsection.
B.

Proportionality

We have already seen that a reasonable proportion between
the goals sought through war and the physical and moral evils
war will bring with it is a factor that must be weighed in deciding whether a country may justly resort to war.1 6 8 Just war
theorist return to the theme of proportionality in discussing
how war may be waged justly: in any given action, one must
refrain from causing harm that is disproportionate to the objective of that action.
www.icrc.org(Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/party_main treaties/$File/IHL and
other relatedTreaties.pdf. Other non-signatories include India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, and Turkey as well as 21 smaller countries.
167 Many just war theorists simply take for granted that some civilians
may
justly be killed provided they are not directly targeted. Those just war theorists
who ask why this is permissible generally have recourse to some form of the principle of double effect. Double effect is a general moral principle or method of analysis. It applies not only to war but to a broad range of situations in which the
pursuit of a good result leads to undesired consequences which would be morally
reprehensible if the actor deliberately aimed to produce them. The principle of
double effect holds that one may perform an action which has some foreseen evil
consequences provided that four conditions are met: 1) the action one performs
must be in itself morally good or at least morally neutral; 2) the actor must intend
the morally good consequences, not the evil ones; 3) the morally evil effect may not
be the means of achieving the good effect; and 4) the morally good effect should
outweigh the morally evil effect. An overview of the principle of double effect can
be found in NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA Vol. 4, p. 880 (2nd ed. 2002). See also,
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90
ETHICS 527 (1980); J. MANGAN, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
DOUBLE EFFECT, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 40, 61 (1949). For a critique of the
principle, especially as applied to war, see HOLMES, supra note 8, at 193-203 (1989). For
a reply to Holmes's critique see Mark Vorobej, Double Effect and the Killing of
Innocents, in JUST WAR, NONVIOLENCE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: PHILOSOPHERS
ON WAR AND PEACE 25 (Duane L. Cady & Werner Richard eds., 1991).
168 See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
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In bello proportionality requires that "only minimum force
consistent with the aim be used."16 9 In assessing the costs of a
particular operation, just war theory requires combatants not
simply to minimize costs to their own forces but rather to try to
achieve their objectives with the least destruction possible for
all concerned. 170 In fact, just war theorists generally require
in order to
armies to accept some increased risk to 1themselves
71
reduce the number of civilian casualties.
In addition, proportionality requires asking whether the
immediate objective being sought (for example, capturing a particular enemy position) is sufficiently important to justify tac17 2
tics that will cause a given amount of death and destruction.
In the view of those authors who view the prohibition against
direct attacks on civilians as absolute,1 73 in bello proportionality comes into play only once the principle of discrimination has
been applied. If an action is prohibited altogether, there is no
room for asking whether the evil effects it produces are outweighed by its good effects. "As one does not rightly ask how
many people it is proportionate to torture, so one does not ask
whether it is proportionate to attack a schoolyard full of1 chil74
dren. Discrimination prohibits doing those things at all."
169 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 88.
170 See ALLEN, supra note 53 at 47.
171 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 16, at 153-55; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Conference: The Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War and HumanitarianIntervention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, Apr. 6, 2000. Not surprisingly, this aspect of just
war theory has at times met with a hostile reception. The Israeli philosopher Assa
Casher, for instance denies that there is any obligation to endanger the lives of
soldiers to save enemy lives. See GROSS, TERRORISM; NON-COMBATANTS; CviLIANS;
INTERNATIONAL LAw at 473 (citing ASSA CAHSER, ETIKA TzAVIT MILITARY ETHICS
158 (1996), cited in. The Commanding General of the United States Strategic Air
Command testifying before a Congressional Committee in the 1960s said: "I get a
little indignant with people who become very lofty in their thinking and do not
want to kill a few of the enemy but would gladly risk additional American lives.
My crews are more important to me than the enemy." House Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations
1960 (86th Cong., 1st Sess.) Part II, p. 388. Quoted in ROBERT TUCKER, THE JUST
WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DOCTRINE 88 (1960). Current American doctrine with its heavy stress on reducing American casualties seems to turn
the traditional position on its head, transforming it into one of combatant immunity. See Elshtain, Grotius Lecture at 6.
172 See O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 38-42 (1981)
173 See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
174 ALLEN, supra note 53, at 47. Cf. Michael Quinlan, supra note 133 (distinguishing the principle of discrimination and the principle of proportionality);
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Since the middle of the 19th century, stress has been placed
on avoiding unnecessary suffering of combatants. The movement to ban weapons that cause unnecessary suffering met
with its first success in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.
The signatories to the declaration agreed "the only legitimate
object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." 1 75 Since this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their
deaths inevitable," 176 they declared that the use of such arms
would be "contrary to the laws of humanity."1 7 7 Specifically,
they renounced the use of small projectiles "which are explosive
78
or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances."
The century and a half since the St. Peterburg Declaration
has witnessed considerable development in the area of both customary and conventional international law reflecting the prohibition against causing unnecessary suffering. Among the most
recent developments are the 1997 Ottawa Landmines Treaty, 1 79
signed by more than 140 countries and ratified by more than
120 (although not the United States), and the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 8 0 whose
four protocols deal with blinding lasers,' 8 ' incendiary weapons,' 8 2 landmines and booby-traps, 8 3 and weapons that injure
with glass fragments or other substances that cannot be seen
with x-rays, making the treatment of wounds exceptionally difficult.' 8 4 These treaties banning certain weapons, whatever
JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? 59 (1984).

(Applying the
distinction between the principle of discrimination and the principle of proportionality to Israel's attacks on Lebanon).

D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 102 (1988).
Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1507
180 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have In175
176

discriminate Effects, 19 I.L.M. 1524, (1980).
181
182
183
184

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol

IV
III
II
I
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their limitations and defects, bear witness to the belief of the
international community that nations should show restraint in
warfare and that not everything that can be done may be done.
Beginning with the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the development of aerial bombardment made increasingly urgent not
only the question of direct deliberate bombing of civilian
targets, which we have already discussed,18 5 but also the issue
of acceptable levels of civilian casualties in attacks on legitimate military targets.18 6 This concern is reflected in Article 35
of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention. After setting
forth the general principle that there are limits on the means
that may legitimately be used in war,18 7 the Protocol prohibits
the employment of "methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."' 88 In addition to
prohibiting deliberate targeting of civilians, the Protocol requires belligerents to avoid civilian casualties that are disproportionate to the military objectives being sought. Specifically,
it prohibits as indiscriminate "an attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 18 9

Application of the principle of in bello proportionality requires judgment and prudence. Even if all the facts were
known beforehand, it would be difficult to weigh casualties
against the value of a military objective. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that decisions must often be made under
battlefield conditions, with severely limited information. Proportionality does, however, provide a guide to decision-making
and certain actions will clearly violate its precepts.

185 See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
186 Article 51, Paragraph. 5 of Protocol Additional, for example, prohibits attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated."
Protocol Additional, supra note 165, art. 51, para. 5.
187 Protocol Additional, supra note 165 at art. 35.
188 Id. art. 35, para. 2.
189 Id. art. 51, para. 5.
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C.

In bello Restraints and Military Necessity

International law acknowledges that the imperative of winning the war or the battle may justify attacks on legitimate military targets despite their consequences for civilians and
civilian objects. 190 This doctrine of military necessity1 9 1 has
come to play an important role in modern just war theory. In
the view of some authors, military necessity reduces the in bello
190 See Francoise Hampson, Military Necessity, in

CRIMES OF WAR,WHAT THE

PUBLIC SHOULD KNow 251-252 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff, eds., 1999).
191 As first introduced by the Lieber Code, the concept of military necessity

was designed to limit the tactics used in war. The Lieber Code defines military
necessity as "the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing
the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war." General Order 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, generally known as the Lieber Code, U.S. War Department, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, art. 37 [Lieber Code], reprinted in
The Laws of Armed Conflicts 3 (3rd rev. ed., Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds.,
1988). This definition excludes the use not only of unlawful means but also of
violence which is not "indispensable for securing the ends of the war." Id. The
Lieber Code's treatment of military necessity incorporates indirectly the concept of
civilian immunity. In fact, according to the Code, military necessity "admits of all
direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies," Id. but killing and maiming of
other persons is permitted only if their destruction "is incidentally unavoidable in
the armed contests of war." Id. art. 15. By implication, civilians may not be directly targeted and commanders must strive to avoid all injury to civilians which is
not unavoidable. The Code explicitly states that military necessity does not justify
torture, the use of poison, or the "wanton devastation of a district," (Id. art. 16)
because "Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God." Id. art. 15.
For further discussion of the Lieber Code, see Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber
and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principleof MilitaryNecessity,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213 (1998).
Recent United States military doctrine reflects this conception of military necessity. For instance, a military manual published in the mid 1970s, Air Force Publication 110-31, defines military necessity as "the principle which justifies measures
of regulated force not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for
securing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditure
of economic and human resources. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, InternationalLaw-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations 1-5-6. C (1976) (reported obsolete on the Air Force e-publications site at http:!
/www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubs/obsolete-search.asp?Keyword=110-31).
The authors of AFP 110-31 break down this definition into four basic elements: "(i) that
the force used is capable of being and is in fact regulated by the user; (ii) that the
use of force is necessary to achieve as quickly as possible the partial or complete
submission of the adversary; (iii) that the force used is no greater in effect on the
enemy's personnel or property than needed to achieve his prompt submission
(economy of force); and (iv) that the force used is not otherwise prohibited." Id at
1-6.
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restraints to mere aspirations that can be ignored whenever
necessary to achieve military objectives, or at least whenever
required to achieve ultimate victory. 19 2 There can be no doubt
that recently, nations have frequently ignored the in bello conditions when they felt that military success required them to do
S0.193 Taylor may be correct in saying that as a matter of law,
when both sides in a conflict feel the need to ignore certain in
bello conditions, those conditions will not be enforced even
against the eventual loser-and thus cease in some sense to have
94
the effect of law.1
It remains true, however, that positive international law
does not view military necessity as justifying any and all violations of the rules of warfare. Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, for instance, recognizes that military necessity may justify
not observing certain minor prohibitions, including the prohibi-

192

See, e.g., Richard Wasserstrom, The Laws of War, in WAR, MORALITY

AND

THE MILITARY PROFESSION 451, 455 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979); TUCKER, supra
note 44, at 90-93; HOLMES, supra note 8, at 101-106 (1989). In general, this position rests ultimately on the belief that there are no actions which are always and
everywhere wrong. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
193 To take just a few examples, both the allies and Germany targeted the civilian population of cities during World War II, and the United States dropped
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to break the resistance of the Japanese
people. More recently, the United States' Christmas bombing of Hanoi appears to
have been aimed not at destroying military targets but at forcing a political decision to negotiate. During the first Gulf War, Iraq launched Scud missiles against
civilian targets, and recent wars in Africa have witnessed numerous cases of atrocities committed against civilians.
194 See Telford Taylor, War Crimes, in WAR, MORALITY AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 426 (Malham M. Wakin, ed. 1979). (When the laws of war are violated
because of military necessity, "no military or other court has been called upon, so
far as I am aware, to declare such killings a war crime.") Taylor's focus is primarily legal rather than moral. Submarine warfare during World War II provides a
striking example of this phenomenon. Article 22 of the Treaty for the Limitation
and Reduction of Naval Armament (London Naval Treaty of 1930) among the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States recognized that international law prohibited sinking merchant ships until their crews and passengers had been put in a safe place, which the treaty specified meant something more
than in a lifeboat. Application of this prohibition would have made it impossible to
use submarines against merchant ships. During World War II, rather than forego
submarine attacks on merchant vessels, the signatories as well as other countries
chose to ignore this provision of international law. See Holmes, supra note 8, at
108 (citing Taylor, id. at 375.
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tion against interfering with the activities of relief personnel1 9 5
and civil defense units.1 9 6 However, it makes no exception for
military necessity in the case of the majority of its most important provisions, including the prohibition against direct targeting of civilian populations and indiscriminate attacks. 19 7 Even
more explicitly, the Protocol prohibits murder, torture, the taking of hostages, and collective punishments "at any time and in
any place whatsoever."9 8
D.

In bello Restraints and Supreme Emergencies

Even if military necessity does not always or even normally
justify violating the in bello restraints, Michael Walzer argues
that it does, in what he has described as "supreme emergencies." Walzer argues vigorously that a just cause does not normally justify violating the laws of war. 19 9 Wars do not always
involve ultimate values, and in wars that do not, even those
who have justice on their side must be prepared to accept defeat
rather than resort to unjust means. 20 0
Nonetheless, he contends that it is appropriate to resort to
unjust means when two conditions are met. First, there must
be no other means available to avert disaster. If victory can be
obtained by other means, even though it will be slower and
more costly, those means must be employed. 20 1 Second, what is
at stake must be "the survival and freedom of political commu195 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex 1. Art. 71.

196 Id. art. 68.
197 Id. art. 51.

198 Id. art. 75. This position is reflected in the writings of some modem commentators. Hampson, for instance, states that "military necessity cannot justify
violation of the other rules of IHL [International Humanitarian Law]." Franqois
Hampson, MilitaryNecessity, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW
251-252 (Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., 1999).
199 See WALZER, supra note 16, at 252.
200 Id.

201 Id. at 261-262 (1977). Walzer finds that in the early years of World War II
this condition was met. England, he argues, could not avert defeat except by indiscriminate attacks on German cities. See id. at 258-60. From 1942 to 1945, however, he believes this condition was no longer met and therefore British bombing of
Dresden and other German cities in the latter days of the war was not justified.
See id. at 261-62. Similarly, Walzer condemns the atom bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. See id. at 263-68.
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by their
nities whose members share a way of life, developed
20 2
children."
their
to
on
passed
be
to
ancestors,
Walzer argues primarily from the case of British resistance
to Nazi Germany. He describes Nazism as "an ultimate threat
to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of
domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who
might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were
literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful." 20 3 He
clearly states, however, that any threat to the "survival and
freedom of political communities" is sufficient to constitute a suthreat does not come from an enpreme emergency, even if20 the
4
emy like Nazi Germany.
Authors who believe that there are absolute moral prohibitions 20 5 reject Walzer's position on grounds that no situation, no
matter how dire, can justify acts like deliberately targeting civilians.2 06 Walzer does not argue that a supreme emergency
justifies direct attacks on civilians or other infractions of the in
bello limitations on combatants. Such infractions, he says, still
20 7
violate the rights of their victims and thus remain immoral.
Nonetheless, he believes statesmen and soldiers, in some sense,
208
must commit them.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 253. He goes on to say, "We see it - and I don't use the phrase lightly
- as evil objectified in the world." Id.
204 Id. at 254. Walzer's position has won support from John Rawls. See John
Rawls, Fifty Years After Hiroshima, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 567
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (civilians "can never be attacked directly except in
times of supreme crisis."). Others have also adopted Walzer's position. See, e.g.,
202
203

JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 187 (supreme emergencies are "cases in which high
values may... be preserved only at the cost of actions which temporarily themselves transgress those very values."); Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human
Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State against Terrorism 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 481 (2002); Nagel,
supra note 160, at 4-6,16-17 (Marshall Cohen, et. al. eds, 1974). (There may be
situations so extreme that one has no choice to do something terrible.)
205 See supra note 159.
206 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 45, at 63-70.
207 See Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in WAR AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 62, 68-70 (Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas
Scanlon ed., 1974).
208 See id. at 254. ("Can soldier and statesmen override the rights of innocent
people for the sake of their own political community? I am inclined to answer this
question affirmatively, though not without hesitation and worry. What choice do
they have? They might sacrifice themselves in order to uphold the moral law, but
they cannot sacrifice their countrymen. Faced with some ultimate horror, their
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Walzer appears to be attempting to hold onto an absolutist
moral position without being willing to accept all of its consequences. Nagel criticizes as "incoherent" the notion that "one
might sacrifice one's moral integrity justifiably, in the service of
a sufficiently worthy end. "209 " If," he says, "one were justified
in making such a sacrifice (or even morally required to make it),
then one would not be sacrificing one's moral integrity by adopt-

ing that course: one would be preserving
V.

it."210

CONCLUSION

The just war tradition rejects both the pacifist contention
that war is always immoral and the realist contention that war
stands outside the confines of moral judgment. It sees war as a
human activity and therefore as subject to moral scrutiny.
Moreover, it sees war as an instrument that statesmen can use
under appropriate circumstances in the pursuit of justice.
Theoretical differences among contemporary strands of just
war theory respond in most cases to differing judgments about
issues that do not themselves fall within the purview of just war
theory.
Differing stances over ius ad bellum issues within the just
war tradition seem to respond in large part to differing assessments of the current state of the international system and of the
direction of its probable and desired evolution. In fact, those
within the just war tradition who assert that war can be justified only in cases of defense against active armed aggression
generally mean that defense is the only justification for an individual country's resort to war. They are normally willing to admit that the United Nations - or perhaps a sufficiently broad
and diverse coalition of states - is justified in using armed force
options exhausted, they will do what they must to save their own people. That is
not to say that their decision is inevitable (I have no way of knowing that), but the
sense of obligation and moral urgency they are likely to feel at such a time is so
overwhelming that a different outcome is hard to imagine.")
In Walzer's thought, this position rests on a broader conviction that political actors

must sometimes chose to do evil for the welfare of the society. When the right

thing to do (in utilitarian terms) is morally wrong, national leaders may be required to do moral wrong in order to fulfill their obligations. See Walzer supra
note 207 at 66.
209 Nagel, supra note 160, at 12.
210 Id. at 12-13.
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in a broader set of circumstances, including severe humanitarian crises. Their differences with those who believe that individual states are justified in declaring war in a wider range of
circumstances respond less to differing assessments of what
causes are sufficiently grave to justify war than to differing assessments of the desirability, probability and urgency of the development of a true supra-national authority. Similarly, recent
debates within the just war tradition over the permissibility of
preemptive actions against so-called "rogue states" seem to reflect not so much differences over the factors to be taken into
account in determining when preventive actions are justified as
differences over the role of the United States in the current international system.
Differences over ius in bello issues also depend on factors
that lie outside the scope of just war theory, but here, the crucial differences involve not assessments of the state of the international system but rather fundamental moral theories. In
fact, the status of the ius in bello restraints depends directly on
whether one adopts an absolutist or consequentialist point of
view in moral theory. For consequentialists, for example, civilian immunity is a weighty factor, but it does not amount to an
absolute prohibition. In their view, when the stakes are high
enough, direct attacks on civilians can be morally justified and
may even be required. By contrast, moral absolutists treat civilian immunity as a flat prohibition; such attacks can never be
justified no matter how great the benefits they bring with them.
For those who are looking for simple apodictic answers to
the question of whether a particular war is just or not, these
features of the just war tradition will prove disappointing. This
is not, however, a valid criticism of the just war tradition.
Questions as complex as those raised by the just war tradition
rarely if ever admit irrefutably true answers and are never independent of our stance on broader questions. What we can expect from the just war tradition is not simple answers but a set
of questions to guide us in making prudential judgments.
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